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PEACE BY OTHER MEANS: USING REWARDS IN UN
EFFORTS TO END CONFLICTS*
EDWARD A. AMLEY, JR.**
INTRODUCTION
At the international level and in a variety of domestic contexts, in-
stitutions and processes such as judicial mechanisms, elections, and
legislatures that are designed to manage conflict have either never ex-
isted or fallen apart. Thus, the United Nations continues to face a vari-
ant of the following scenario: Electronic media outlets have begun to
broadcast reports of civil strife and mass violence in a given state. How
should the UN diplomats who meet to discuss the crisis respond? They
might impose economic sanctions on the parties to the potentially-
destabilizing conflict. Or, should the UN Secretary-General appoint a
special representative? This agent could then attempt to broker a set-
tlement through mediation. Finally, the Security Council might use
military muscle to generate a resolution to the crisis.
During the past decade, numerous observers have taken note of the
UN's enlarged role in managing both domestic and international con-
flicts.' Part II of this Article surveys the strategies that it has em-
ployed to bring disputes to an end. This discussion is intertwined with
an attempt to identify the strengths and limits of these conventional
* For reading and reacting to drafts of this Article, I thank W. Michael Reisman, Ruth
Wedgwood, Jeff Anton, Ash Bali, Christopher Coleman, Mary Eliza Kimball, Julian Ku,
and Kaoru Okuizumi.
** J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, 1998.
1. See Report of the Secretary General on an Agenda for Peace-Preventative Diplo-
macy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, P 3, U.N. Doc. S/24111 (1992), reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 953, 956 (1992) (asserting that "an opportunity has been regained to achieve the
great objectives of the Charter-a United Nations capable of maintaining international
peace and security .... "); Ibrahim J. Gassama, Safeguarding the Democratic Entitlement:
A Proposal for United Nations Involvement in National Politics, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
287, 287 (1997) ("United Nations participation in the conduct of national elections has
become one of the most visible and concrete aspects of U.N. involvement in the domestic
affairs of independent countries today."); Anne Orford, Locating the International: Mili-
tary and Monetary Interventions After the Cold War, 38 HARV. INT'L L. J. 443, 443 (1997)
(referring to "the revitalization and expansion of the United Nations collective security
system"); Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Global Leadership After the Cold War, FOREIGN AFF.,
Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 86 (1996) (arguing that "the United Nations can help deal with the
challenges that globalization and fragmentation pose now and in the future"). However,
the ability of the UN to play a dominant role in international affairs may have been over-
estimated. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-
Oct. 1997, at 183 ("Many thought that the new world order proclaimed by George Bush
was the promise of 1945 fulfilled, a world in which international institutions, led by the
United Nations, guaranteed international peace and security with the active support of
the world's major powers. That world order is a chimera.").
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conflict-resolution approaches.
Unlike military force or diplomatic persuasion, positive induce-
ments have not gained widespread currency in international affairs.
Accounting for the failure of rewards to become entrenched in world
politics is the concern of Part III. It also attempts to isolate such meas-
ures from other attempts to influence international actors.
Part IV identifies and discusses considerations that may drive UN
positive inducement strategies. If international organizations recom-
mend rewarding a party instead of relying upon military force, in which
kinds of conflicts are such measures likely to be most effective? What
form might these gestures take? At what point in the conflict-
resolution process should they be utilized? Finally, how would the UN
need to change institutionally to harness the full promise of reward-
based strategies? In confronting these questions, this Part of the Arti-
cle concludes that multiple considerations will drive the decision to in-
fluence disputants through positive inducements.
II. UN CONFLICT-SUPPRESSION STRATEGIES: THE CURRENT STATE OF
PLAY
The UN's current activism in the area of dispute-resolution repre-
sents a clear break from the past. Before the end of the Cold War, the
superpowers monopolized this activity. They attempted to ensure
global stability by brokering settlements to local and regional contests.2
During this period, the UN' sometimes played a peripheral role in the
resolution of conflicts, usually by coordinating deployments of small,
lightly-armed peace-keeping 3 forces that carried out tasks like cease-
fire monitoring.
Since 1989, the international community has handed the UN an
expanding conflict-resolution brief. First, states have called upon the
UN to preside over the settlement of various violent manifestations of
the Cold War that the superpowers had not been able to resolve by
2. See I. William Zartman & Saadia Touval, Mediation: The Role of Third-Party Di-
plomacy and Informal Peacemaking, in RESOLVING THIRD WORLD: CHALLENGES FOR A
NEW ERA 239, 241 (Sheryl J. Brown & Kimber M. Schraub eds., 1992) (finding that the
United States was involved as "a mediator on at least ninety occasions, and the Soviet
Union on at least twenty").
3. For the purposes of this Article, the term, "peace operation" functions as a generic
expression for the efforts involving a significant UN presence that have been undertaken
around the world to settle conflicts. It encompasses peacekeeping ventures, which usually
consist of small military contingents presiding over cease fire and force withdrawal
agreements. Meanwhile, peacebuilding efforts are multifaceted operations involving mili-
tary and civilian components that usually follow the successful negotiation of a compre-
hensive accord between warring factions. Finally, peace enforcement operations denote
UN attempts to use forcible measures to bring peace to a given context.
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1989. 4 The UN has also begun to respond to the strife that has become
a fixture of the current landscape in many areas of the world.5 To settle
conflicts, the UN has relied upon various options.
A. Mediation
In some situations, the UN has played the role of diplomatic
troubleshooter or mediator. 6 The considerable legitimacy and credibil-
ity the UN commands justifies these mediation efforts. 7 Usually, UN
mediation initiatives take the form of attempts by a representative of
the Secretary-General to open lines of communication between adver-
saries. This individual also facilitates negotiations and dialogue and
persuades the disputants to settle their differences.5
4. The UN has formulated and implemented settlements designed to end conflicts in
Namibia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mozambique, Angola, Afghanistan, and Cambodia. See
Trevor Finallay, The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping, in CHALLENGES FOR
THE NEW PEACEKEEPERS 1, 31 (Trevor Finallay ed., 1996) (referring to "the largest and
most ambitious post-cold war missions .. . (notably those in Cambodia, El Salvador, Mo-
zambqiue)").
5. Illustrations of such conflicts are the ongoing hostilities in Rwanda and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. See Adam Steinfeld, Note, Nuclear Objections: The Persistent Objector and
the Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1635, 1636 n.4 (1996) ("The
recent UN peacekeeping operations in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina are indicative of
the expanded scope of UN peacekeeping.").
6. In 1980, the Secretary-General appointed a representative to resolve the conflict
in Afghanistan. This position continues to exist. See, e.g., Taliban Chief Ready for Talks
with Opposition, Agence France-Presse, Dec. 28, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13461887
("Meanwhile outgoing UN envoy for Afghanistan, Norbert Holl, expressed the hope that
peace initiatives including those by the so-called group of eight countries would reach
'tangible results in the foreseeable future."'). Prior to the entrance into force of the latest
peace agreement in Angola, a UN diplomat, Alioune Bloudin Beye, attempted to broker an
agreement between the factions involved in the conflict that has plagued this country.
See, e.g., U.S. Backs Extension Of U.N. Mission In Angola, Afr. News Serv., Jan. 29, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 6607122 (reporting appreciation expressed "to the Secretary-
General's Special Representative, Maitre Blondin Beye, for his devotion to the cause of
peace in Angola."). A UN representative has worked to bring about a settlement to the
seemingly intractable conflict in Burundi. Before resigning, Ahmedou Ould Abdullah, one
previous UN representative in Burundi, was quoted as saying, "[tihis country [Burundi]
does not need soldiers, it needs psychiatrists." Bubbling Over, ECONOMIST, Jan. 6, 1996,
at 32.
7. As Saadia Touval has asserted, "[]everage is, of course, also a matter of legiti-
macy and credibility. This is the main U.N. asset: the aura of legitimacy its actions carry
as representing the consensus of the international community." Saadia Touval, Why the
U.N. Fails, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 52.
8. Touval, for example, has noted:
Mediators must offer their 'good offices' to help disputants communicate.
They try to persuade each party to change its image of the adversary or to
interpret the adversary's behavior in a manner that will facilitate a settle-
ment. Mediators can help a party understand its adversary's concerns and
constraints. They also suggest compromises and help parties save face in
making concessions. Disputants, for example, often believe that it is less
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In the course of mediation efforts, the UN has encountered several
problems. First, the parties may simply refuse to enter into discussion.
Alternatively, they could deal in bad faith while hoping that the politi-
cal-military tide on the ground will turn or run more strongly in their
favor. 9 Even subtle shifts in the balance of power between two parties
may allow recalcitrant actors to negotiate from a position of strength.
Second, the fact that the UN is an international organization ham-
strings its ability to engage in diplomatic mediation efforts. According
to Saadia Touval, the necessity that UN initiatives enjoy the continuing
support of its members, especially those that hold permanent seats on
the Security Council, "saps the United Nations of necessary dynamism
and flexibility in pursuing mediation. Once the United Nations agrees
on a mediating proposal or framework, it cannot easily be modified in
response to changing circumstances." 10 Moreover, the effectiveness of
UN mediation may be undermined by individual states that could con-
ceivably withdraw their support from international peace efforts. For
example, the United States reversed its stance on the plan formulated
by Cyrus Vance and David Owen in the course of a joint UN-European
damaging to their reputations to accept a proposal made by a mediator than
an adversary.
Touval, supra note. 7, at 51. Touval's conception of mediation aligns with the one offered
by Ronald J. Fisher and Loraleigh Keashly, who characterize this activity as "interven-
tions by credible and competent intermediaries who assist the parties in working toward
a negotiated settlement on substantive issues through persuasion, the control of informa-
tion, the suggestion of alternatives and in some cases, the application of leverage."
Ronald J. Fisher & Loraleigh Keashly, The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and
Consultation Within a Contingency Model of a Third Party Intervention, 28 J. PEACE RES.
29, 30 (1991). Stephen R. Ratner identifies still other roles that mediators are called upon
to play. These include providing face-saving and escape routes, redefining issues, taking
steps to contain the dispute, and ensuring compliance in the event an agreement is
reached. STEPHEN R. RATNER, THE NEW UN PEACEKEEPING: BUILDING PEACE IN LANDS
OF CONFLICT AFTER THE COLD WAR 47 (1995).
9. Larman C. Wilson and Raill Gonzilez Diaz have written on the talks between the
Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberaci6n Nacional (FMLN) and the El Salvadoran govern-
ment that began in September 1989. Two months later, the guerrillas launched a violent
offensive in San Salvador "designed to silence the [Alfredo] Cristiani government's report
that the FMLN was finished, thus improving the insurgency's position at the negotiating
table." Larman C. Wilson & Rauil Gonzilez Diaz, UN Peacekeeping in Central America, in
A CRISIS OF EXPECTATIONS: UN PEACEKEEPING IN THE 1990S 141, 146 (Ramesh Thakur &
Carlyle A. Thayer eds., 1995). At the same time, according to Touval:
[I]t is sometimes possible for mediators to induce ripeness and contribute to
the making of a 'hurting stalemate.' They help create a disposition among
the disputants to settle the conflict. Having an interest in a settlement, me-
diators sometimes bargain with the parties, offer them incentives, or subject
them to pressure in order to induce them to accept specific settlement terms.
Touval, supra note 7, at 51.
10. Touval, supra note 7, at 54. This is not to downplay the role that international
organizations can play in mediation. For examples of some of the services that such enti-
ties can provide, see Touval, supra note 7, at 55-56.
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Union effort to broker a political settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. '
B. Punitive Measures
The use of negative incentives, or sticks, as some commentators
may have mislabeled such inducements,12 has figured into UN efforts to
end conflicts. The Security Council has authorized economic sanctions,
threats to use military force, or its actual employment. Sometimes, it
has combined these measures with purely diplomatic mediation efforts.
Sanctions regimes played roles in the international community's
response to such events as the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the 1991
coup in Haiti that overthrew the government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide,
and the civil strife in the former Yugoslavia. Imposed by the UN pur-
suant to Article 41 of its Charter, sanctions may represent a way to
force recalcitrant actors in these conflicts to change their ways while
minimizing military force. 13 The sanctions applied to Iraq before the
Persian Gulf War, however, were not given sufficient time to work. 14
Also, the package currently in force has not induced Baghdad to comply
with numerous Security Council decisions made in the wake of the Iraqi
military defeat in 1991.15 In contrast, sanctions may function as part of
the explanation for the Haitian junta's decision to go into exile and for
Serbia's move to distance itself from the Bosnian Serbs in 1994.16
11. For the text of this instrument, see Report of the Secretary General on the Activi-
ties of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia: Peace Talks on Bosnia and
Herzegovina, U.N. SCOR, 48th sess., U.N. Doc. S/25479 (1993)).
12. Opinions about the actual meaning and origins of the phrase, "carrots and sticks,"
abound. See WILLIAM SAFIRE, I STAND CORRECTED: MORE ON LANGUAGE FROM WILIAM
SAFIRE 65-66 (1984); WILLIAM & MARY MORRIS, MORRIS DICTIONARY OF WORD AND
PHRASE ORIGINS 114-15 (1971).
13. The UN has imposed sanctions and arms embargoes on Iraq, the then-Rhodesia,
South Africa, Libya, Somalia, Liberia, and Serbia. See, e.g., Economic Sanctions Are Criti-
cized from Inside, Outside the U.N., Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Dec. 22, 1997, available in
Westlaw, All News Plus Wires File ("The [Security] council in past years has imposed
sanctions against Libya, Liberia, Haiti, Angola, Serbia and Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Rwanda and Sudan."). On October 1, 1996, the Security Council lifted the
sanctions that had been imposed on Serbia as well as the Serb component of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. See S.C. Res. 1074, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3700th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1074 (1996).
14. See, e.g., As U.S., Japan Look Ahead, OAKLAND TRIB., Dec. 9, 1991, at B6 ("Japan
disagreed with the American choice of going to war rather than allow economic sanctions
to work against Iraq.").
15. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/794
(1992); S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990).
16. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Himes, War by Other Means: Criteria for the Use of Eco-
nomic Sanctions, COMMONWEALTH, Feb. 28, 1997, at 13, available in 1997 WL 12635327
("As in South Africa and Haiti, sanctions work better if there is a substantial domestic
opposition to the government and if there are powerful classes or groups involved in in-
ternational business who will feel the impact quickly."); Keep Up Pressure on Serbia, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 5, 1994, at A22 ("If the split [between Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs] is in-
1998 239
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Like sanctions, military force has become an increasingly common
UN strategy during the post-Cold War era. Before the Persian Gulf
War and in Haiti, the UN authorized ad-hoc coalitions of states to use
military force pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 17 In the
wake of the breakdown of civil order in Somalia, the Unified Task Force
(UNITAF) tried a similar approach.18 However, decisionmakers did not
target military force at any one actor in this anarchy-plagued region.
Similarly, the UN integrated threats of North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO) air strikes in Bosnia-Herzegovina to gain leverage over
the disputants in this conflict after an attempt managed directly by the
UN to bring peace to this country faltered. 19 Finally, following the es-
tablishment of the Second United Nations Operation in Somalia
(UNOSOM II), troops engaged in combat against parties that were seen
as hostile to the settlement process. 20
The UN's use of punitive measures has attracted controversy and
encountered problems. Generally, this strategy opens the UN up to
charges of partiality. As Henry Wiseman has argued, "the necessity for
[UN] 'impartiality' in word and deed continues to be imperative. Yet,
this will be all the more difficult to ensure in multifaceted civil con-
flicts." 21 Meanwhile, a problem specific to nonviolent economic sanc-
tions is the potentially significant amount of time that must elapse be-
fore they are likely to be effective. There are also the difficulties and
expense of mounting efforts to enforce them. Although the UN has suc-
cessfully sanctioned states involved in conflict that pitted them against
much of the rest of the international community, their effective use in
internal contexts seems less assured. 22 Sanctions also can cause a tre-
deed genuine, the so-called Contact Group-the U.S., Europe and Russia-can take sitis-
faction in the success of the economic sanctions on Serbia, which drove Milosevic's deci-
sion.").
17. See S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/678
(1990) (authorizing states, vis-A-vis Iraq, "to use all necessary means to uphold and im-
plement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore in-
ternational peace and security in the area;").
18. John L. Hirsch & Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflec-
tions on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping 45 (1995) (noting that UNITAF "would be not a
UN force, but one endorsed by the Security Council.").
19. See, e.g., Diane Bartz, NATO Airstrikes Aimed at Peace but Could Delay It,
Agence France-Presse, Aug. 31, 1995, available in 1995 WL 7850289 ("The airstrikes and
artillery fire that have hit Bosnian Serbs have been aimed at bringing peace to Sarajevo").
20. See HIRSCH & OAKLEY, supra note 18, at 122-23 ("UNOSOM activities were al-
most entirely directed at the military struggle with the SNA [beginning in 1993]").
21. Henry Wiseman, Peacekeeping in the International Political Context: Historical
Analysis and Future Directions, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND PEACEKEEPING: RESULTS,
LIMITATIONS AND PROSPECTS: THE LESSONS OF 40 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 32, 43 (Indar Jit
Rikhye & Kjell Skjelsbaek eds., 1990).
22. Sanctions were applied to the Bosnian Serbs and targeted at UNITA-held areas of
Angola. See, e.g., Michael Littlejohns, Security Council to Penalise Angola Rebels, FIN.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 1997, at 4 ("The United Nations Security Council last night unanimously
VOL. 26:2
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mendous amount of collateral damage to innocent bystanders. They
can impoverish private citizens in the target area and bankrupt coun-
tries and firms that maintain trading 'relationships with the targets.
Sanctions, moreover, may cultivate the growth of a siege mentality
among members of the state or community at which they are directed. 23
Finally, some commentators have questioned the legality of economic
sanctions. 24
Employing military force presents the UN with numerous chal-
lenges. In some situtations, it has attempted to "subcontract" military
responsibilities out to a regional organization or to an ad-hoc coalition
of states. This has proven to be operationally effective. 25 For example,
the alliance that took part in Desert Storm successfully repelled Iraqi
aggression against Kuwait. In other contexts, international military ef-
forts have achieved more modest objectives. These include the Ameri-
can-dominated military involvement in Haiti, the UNITAF period of the
international community's efforts in Somalia, and the operations car-
ried out by the NATO Implementation Force and Stabilization Force.
The danger of allowing non-UN military forces to manage conflicts
should be apparent. The subcontracting entity may overstep its man-
date. However, if the UN vigorously monitors the activities of the sub-
contractor, this may be unlikely to happen. In a situation where serious
differences of opinion regarding the role of the outside military force
exist, the UN could withdraw its endorsement of the venture.
Second, it may be that the great powers will use subcontracting as
a way to regain or maintain hegemony in their traditional spheres of
adopted tougher sanctions against the Unita movement in Angola in an attempt to force it
to honour a commitment to a 1994 peace agreement with the Angolan central govern-
ment."). It is unclear what role they played in inducing these parties to become more re-
ceptive to international diplomatic efforts to achieve a settlement in the Balkans and An-
gola.
23. The Economist reported that due, in part, to the sanctions that were imposed on
them, "the Serbs passionately believe themselves to be the Bosnian conflict's victims. Far
from being weighed down by guilt, they consider themselves, if anything, the most ag-
grieved party in the Bosnian nightmare-indeed, one of the most aggrieved peoples in the
entire world." Serbia: Another Country, ECONOMIST, July 23, 1994, at 47. Similarly,
Richard Haass has noted that sanctions imposed on South Africa "tended to push whites
into the laager (a defensive posture similar to 'circling the wagons), thus reducing further
the chance for meaningful political dialogue." RICHARD N. HAAss, CONFLICTS UNENDING:
THE UNITED STATES AND REGIONAL DISPUTES 117 (1990).
24. See Stephen C. Neff, Economic Warfare in Contemporary International Law:
Three Schools of Thought, Evaluated According to an Historical Method, 26 STAN. J.
INT'L. L. 67 (1989) (assessing the legality of economic sanctions).
25. See Kofi A. Annan, Sovereignty Challenged, An Interview with U.N. Secretary-
General Kofi A. Annan, 21 FLETCHER. FOR. WORLD AFF. 1, 4 (1997) C'Such cooperation
will continue, as the United Nations is incapable of taking on all of the world's problems
and often regional organizations are better-suited to addressing aspects of a conflict.").
But see John Quigley, The "Privatization" of Security Council Enforcement Action: A
Threat To Multilateralism, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 249 (1996).
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influence, and to legitimize it as well. US troops played a pivotal role in
the peace operation in Haiti. Russian troops loomed large in the UN
venture undertaken in Georgia, which has unfolded under the auspices
of the United Nations Observer Mission.
Third, subcontracting may wrongly assume that a capable military
instrument can always be located to carry out the requisite operational
objectives. However, the usual players, including NATO or a coalition
led by the US, may characterize the troublespot as strategically insig-
nificant and refuse to commit forces abroad. In the post-Cold War era,
broad swaths of Africa fall outside the security umbrellas of the great
powers. Thus, when order in this region breaks down, it may be diffi-
cult to find qualified candidates to restore it.
Finally, coordination problems have cropped up in situations where
non-UN military assets assume responsibility for the military aspects of
conflict-resolution strategies while the UN employs diplomacy and pro-
vides humanitarian assistance to noncombatants. For example, observ-
ers criticized the "dual key"26 system developed by NATO and the UN,
which provided that each organization sign off on punitive air strikes
before they could be undertaken against targets in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 27 The complicated and unwieldy chains of command that
this approach engendered hampered the effective utilization of military
might as an inducement strategy.
Rather than rely on an outside authority to use military force, the
Security Council could simply order troops operating under its direction
to compel recalcitrant disputants to settle their differences. Even be-
fore the failure of the military component of UNOSOM II, some ques-
tioned whether the UN lacked the capacity to manage a large operation
making liberal use of robust military force.28 Thus, in December 1992,
former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali lobbied for the es-
tablishment of UNITAF led by the US even though he would have pre-
ferred the creation of a humanitarian enforcement operation under UN
26. See generally, Tom Post and Rod Nordland who characterized the "dual key" ap-
proach as "the cumbersome chain of command that relied on U.N. civilians to approve
NATO air power." Tom Post & Rod Nordland, For Shame, NEWSWEEK, July 31, 1995, at
20; see also Giandomenico Picco, The U.N. and the Use of Force: Leave the Secretary Gen-
eral Out of It, FOREIGN. AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 14 (contending that "the confused chain
of command that we have witnessed in the Balkans has helped neither the credibility of
the institution nor the effectiveness of the international effort.").
27. See, e.g., Susan R. Lamb, The UN Protection Force in Former Yugoslavia, in A
CRISIS OF EXPECTATIONS: UN PEACEKEEPING IN THE 1990S 65, 78 (Ramesh Thakur &
Carlyle A. Thayer eds., 1995).
28. Proposals to strengthen the UN's ability to manage peace enforcement operations
have proliferated during the post-Cold War era. See, e.g., Jim Whitman & Ian Bartholo-
mew, UN Peace Support Operations: Political-Military Considerations, in BEYOND
TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING 169 (Donald C.F. Daniel & Bradd C. Hayes eds., 1995).
VOL. 26:2
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command. 29 Boutros-Ghali also attempted to delay the transfer of
authority over military activities from this force to UNOSOM 11.30 In
the wake of what transpired during this phase of the Somali operation,
opposition to the utilization of force by UN military units has solidified.
Although the UN may ultimately develop a capacity to direct large-
scale military peace enforcement operations, it still must rely on states
to contribute troops. Governments may be hesitant to make these
committments, especially when the UN is involved in an area consid-
ered low on the contributing country's national security agenda. 31
Thus, until the UN establishes some sort of military structure that ex-
ists independently of domestic armed forces, the willingness of govern-
ments to contribute personnel to UN military efforts will constrain the
extent to which this approach can be used. 32
Members of the international community may allow the UN to
utilize military might quickly and with relative ease. However, it would
be shortsighted to regard military force and other punitive policies as
the only way by which settlements to conflicts can be achieved. As
David A. Baldwin has observed, "two of the most important weaknesses
in traditional theorizing about international politics have been the ten-
dency to exaggerate the effectiveness of military power resources and
the tendency to treat military power as the ultimate measuring rod to
which other forms of power should be compared."33 Indeed, "[iun some
situations, force works very well, but in others it is counterproduc-
tive."34 Even where military response is warranted, some weapons and
tactics will clearly be inappropriate.
29. Robert G. Patman, The UN Operation in Somalia, in A CRISIS OF EXPECTATIONS:
UN PEACEKEEPING IN THE 1990S 85, 93 (Ramesh Thakur & Carlyle A. Thayer eds., 1995).
30. See HIRSCH & OAKLEY, supra note 18, at 112 ("The military side of the transfer
[from UNITAF to UNOSOM II] was flawed in several respects.").
31. The sqeamishness displayed by many Western countries, whose troops play im-
portant roles in UN peace operations because they are most likely to possess the training
and equipment to carry out the complicated requirements that such missions demand, can
be attributed to several causes. These include 24-hour live television news and the
shrinking size of families in this region's countires. For example, Edward C. Luck has
recounted that "some graphic pictures on [Cable News Network] CNN and a score of
deaths in an ill-fated Ranger raid convinced US policymakers to beat a hasty retreat from
Somalia." Edward C. Luck, The Case for Engagement: American Interests in UN Peace
Operations, in BEYOND TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING 67, 77 (Donald C.F. Daniel & Bradd
C. Hayes eds. 1995); see also Edward N. Luttwak, Toward Post-Heroic Warfare, FOREIGN
AFF., May-June 1995, at 115; Edward N. Luttwak, Where Are the Great Powers? At Home
with the Kids, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 1994, at 23.
32. See, e.g., Kai Bird, The New Case for a U.N. Army: Humanitarian Intervention,
NATION, Aug. 8, 1994, at 160; Brian Urquhart, For a UN Volunteer Military Force, N.Y.
REV. BOOKS, June 10, 1993, at 3-4.
33. David Baldwin, Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends Versus Old Ten-
dencies, 31 WORLD POL. 161, 180 (1979).
34. Id. at 181.
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C. Judicial Management
Using law to mold the behavior of disputants has colored UN
peace-making strategies. It is possible to view the International Crimi-
nal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia as components of
larger UN efforts to gain leverage over the parties to these two con-
flicts. 35 Unfortunately, the supervision over a party that a suprana-
tional judicial entity can achieve seems likely to be indirect. For exam-
ple, the existence of a court may propel a disputant to become less
receptive to a negotiated settlement to the conflict. If this party tri-
umphs militarily and manages to translate its victory into an advanta-
geous political settlement, the likelihood that it will be successfully
prosecuted recedes dramatically. On the other hand, closing down a
tribunal because the UN's political efforts to broker a settlement have
succeeded would hardly qualify as a principled course of action. The
rule of law at the international level would be undermined. Moreover,
individuals who have been indicted for violations of international hu-
manitarian law would not be able to respond to the allegations lodged
against them.
D. Isolation
The UN can attempt to ignore or isolate parties to conflicts. Before
what remained of Yugoslavia ended its overt military backing of the
Bosnian Serbs, David Gompert called for "an international cold war" in
conjunction with economic sanctions against this country.36 According
to him, "[a] sustained economic and information war against Serbia
should in time topple the Belgrade regime and permit a more principled
and lasting settlement in Yugoslavia than anything within reach to-
day."37 In Cambodia, meanwhile, the UN tried something akin to this
approach. When the Khmer Rouge failed to comply with the demobili-
zation and disarmament provisions of the settlement agreement that
emerged from the 1991 Paris Conference on Cambodia, 3.8 the United
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) attempted to
marginalize the Khmer Rouge. This posture worked due to the decision
of the Khmer Rouge to fall "de facto into a policy of passive boycott
during much of the [settlement] process." 39 If the Khmer Rouge had in-
35. See W. Michael Reisman, Institutions and Practices for Restoring and Maintain-
ing Public Order, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 175, 181 (1995).
36. David Gompert, How to Defeat Serbia, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 1994, at 46.
37. Id. at 44.
38. For the texts of the Paris Accords, see Letter Dated 30 October 1991 from the
Permanent Representatives of France and Indonesia to the United Nations Addressed to
the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/461608-S/23177, Annex (1991), reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
180 (1992).
39. James A. Schear, Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping: The Case of Cambodia, in
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stead used its considerable military strength to declare war on the UN,
the accomplishments of UNTAC may not have been attained. Thus, ef-
forts to bring an end to conflicts while neglecting parties that are openly
hostile to the settlement are likely to be effective in only a small uni-
verse of scenarios. 40
III. TOWARDS A THEORY OF UN REWARD STRATEGIES: ACCOUNTING FOR
THE INSIGNIFICANCE OF POSITIVE INDUCEMENTS IN CURRENT CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT AND DIFFERENTIATING REWARDS FROM OTHER INFLUENCE
ATTEMPTS
When relying on diplomacy, coercion, criminalization, marginaliza-
tion, or some mixture of these approaches to end conflicts, the UN has
encountered difficulties. Thus, it is surprising that there has been so
little sustained debate on rewards, positive inducement strategies, posi-
tive incentives, or positive sanctions 41 in attempts to manage destabi-
lizing strife.
A. The Neglected Subject of Positive Inducements
Only a small amount of discussion on rewards in the context of con-
flict-resolution efforts has taken place. Some observers simply assert
that this strategy represents an option for the UN to pursue. 42 It is
somewhat ironic that there should be such a shortage of comment on
UN rewards while discussion of its use of coercive measures has grown
exponentially. 43 Since its founding, the UN has accumulated a wealth
of experience and expertise in providing technical assistance and devel-
opment aid to states. This knowledge might serve as the basis for the
development of sophisticated positive inducement strategies. 44 Thus,
BEYOND TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING 248, 253 (Donald C.F. Daniel & Bradd C. Hayes
eds., 1995).
40. The success of this strategy may have stemmed from the fact that the Khmer
Rouge had earlier signed off on the Paris Accords. It seems doubtful whether UNTAC
could have attained the success it did in the event the Khmer Rouge had not acceded to
this agreement and the UN had attempted to isolate this faction nevertheless.
41. These terms will be used interchangeably.
42. Few have addressed this question. James A Schear, for example, has noted that
"[t]he financial instrument can offer powerful incentives for conflict termination, but it is
not always in synchronisation with the exigencies of peacekeeping operations." Schear,
supra note 39, at 263.
43. (The focus on this latter subject is understandable in light of the emphasis in the
UN Charter on using military force to respond to aggression. Article 42 of this instru-
ment, for example, provides that the Security Council "may take such action by air, sea,
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and secu-
rity." UN CHARTER, art. 42.
44. The UN, it can be argued, made such a sustained foray into areas like providing
development aid to states due to the superpower confrontation. The Cold War hamstrung
its ability to respond militarily to international instability. Unable to play the role of the
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until the UN relies more heavily on rewards, it will have effectively
turned its back on one of its comparative advantages.
The shortage of probative discussion on UN rewards mirrors the
extent to which general comment on positive sanctions has been margi-
nalized in the dominant discourse of such disciplines as law and politi-
cal science. This may be a consequence of the fact that important fig-
ures in these fields have rejected the notion that rewards, as an
inducement strategy, are as efficient and effective as punishments. 45
Louis Kriesberg, for example, has assumed that an imbalance in the at-
tention devoted to negative and positive incentives should exist.46 Oth-
ers vigorously question why so little study of positive inducements has
been attempted. According to Baldwin, one explanation flows from "an
implicit assumption that the distinction between positive and negative
sanctions is not worth making."47 Fred H. Lawson, meanwhile, attrib-
utes diplomatic practice:
The unfavorable connotations that have surrounded the notion of ap-
peasement since the negotiations at Munich... , along with the predi-
lection that statespeople have to think in terms of the 'security di-
lemma' when faced with a conflicted situation, seem to have had a
profound influence upon students of international affairs and their
writing about war.48
Finally, Nancy Kanwisher has observed that "policy-makers...
world's policeman, the UN needed a compelling mission. See Major Louis A. Chiarella,
United Nations Operations: Problems Encountered by United States Forces when Subject
to a "Blue Purse," 154 MIL. L. REV. 53, 58 (1997) ("The UN became a victim of the Cold
War soon after its creation. The mutual mistrust between the United States and the So-
viet Union as military rivals only exacerbated the conflicting ideologies of the two na-
tions.").
45. See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, reprinted in
JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND SHAPING LAW 270 (W. Michael Reisman & Aaron
M. Schreiber eds., 1987). According to Austin:
The greater the eventual evil, and the greater the chance of incurring it, the
greater is the efficacy of the command, and the greater is the strength of the
obligation: Or (substituting expressions exactly equivalent), the greater is
the chance that the command will be obeyed, and that the duty will not be
broken.
Id. at 273-74. Meanwhile, Baldwin has noted that theorists like Max Weber, Talcott Par-
sons, and Peter M. Blau define power in terms of the threat to use or the actual employ-
ment of negative or coercive measures. David Baldwin, The Power of Positive Sanctions,
24 WORLD POL. 19, 20 (1971).
46. According to Kriesberg, "[t]hree basic types of inducements can be combined in
waging a struggle or ending it: coercion, positive sanctions, and persuasion. Coercion,
understandably, has received the most attention in the study of conflicts." LOUIS
KRIESBERG, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE U.S.-U.S.S.R. AND MIDDLE EAST
CASES 83 (1992).
47. Baldwin, supra note 45, at 21.
48. Fred H. Lawson, Using Positive Sanctions to End International Conflicts: Iran
and the Arab Gulf Countries, 20 J. PEACE RES. 311, 311 (1983).
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have mislabeled simple regression phenomena and incorrectly con-
cluded that negative sanctions are more effective than positive sanc-
tions."49 The predominance of punishments in the operation of domestic
political and legal spheres provides a final way to account for the dis-
parity in the amounts of attention directed at positive and negative
sanctions.5 0 However, as Baldwin has suggested:
Positive sanctions are more relevant to international than to domestic
politics, to the underworld than to the overworld [due to the greater
amount of political integration in domestic politics and the overworld].
Since the prospects for success are worse in the international and un-
derworld arenas, the invectives to use positive sanctions instead of
negative ones should be greater (assuming, of course, that other things
are equal). In a well-integrated domestic polity, however, negative
sanctions are more useful. It is only because of the high probability
that most people will obey the law that governments can afford to en-
force laws with threats. It is much cheaper to punish the few who dis-
obey than to reward the many who obey. 51
Although negative sanctions are a prominent part of the operation
of national political and legal structures, rewards play a key role in the
successful functioning of the market, which is increasingly seen by ju-
risdictions around the world as a desirable mechanism for allocating
scarce resources and achieving development.5 2 Meanwhile, arrange-
49. Nancy Kawisher, Cognitive Heuristics and American Security Policy, 33 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 652, 664 (1989).
50. As Arthur A. Leff has noted in his study of the legal system of the Usa, a thinly-
veiled reference to US society, "behind every US Judge stands ultimately the naked power
of the 101st Airborne Division of the US army." Arthur A. Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J.
989, 997 (1978).
51. Baldwin, supra note 45, at 29.
52. Negative inducements such as the fear of unemployment or poverty provide an
incomplete explanation of why most people decide to participate in the life of a market
economy, especially when government social welfare programs that exist in much of the
developed world guarantee individuals a minimum standard of living. Rather, their in-
volvement, which often implies extreme sacrifices in terms of time, effort, and incurring
other opportunity costs, is also likely to be motivated by the possibility of achieving pros-
perity, status, and other rewards. In fact, the attraction of these positive incentives is so
strong in many cases that negative measures and laws, which take the form of antitrust,
securities, and safety regulations, have had to be woven into the economic fabric of many
countries. Cf. Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 628 F. Supp. 746, 759 (E.D. Pa. 1986) ("Allowing
Rothberg to recover would frustrate the purposes of the securities laws by rewarding well-
structured greed."); Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 353, 353 (1988) ("The wave of major insider trading prosecutions has been
taken by many as a symptom of cancerous greed on Wall Street."); Eleanor M. Fox, The
End of Antitrust Isolationism: The Vision of One World 1992, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 221, 236
(1992) ("Many individuals in the Eastern European nations see antitrust law foremost as
a means to control the greed of and abuse by powerful firms and as a means to assure
that entrepreneurs are not foreclosed from markets."). But see David Mcgowan & Mark A.
Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Federalism, Petitioning and the First
Amendment 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 293, 334 (1994) ("Under the normal conception of
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ments such as the command economy, strict quotas, and state-led mod-
els of development, which require the use of negative incentives by
those managing the system to function at all, have become thoroughly
discredited as a means for achieving sustained societal prosperity.53
This Article does not take the view that using rewards as a strategy
to manage conflicts is always an appropriate option. In some contexts,
they may be out of place. Though, it does seem likely that positive
sanctions can be deployed as a force for shaping behavior in discrete
realms of human activity. In short, institutional actors that see positive
inducements as an option to pursue in some contexts may be more suc-
cessful when confronted with complex situations and emergencies than
those that instinctively scoff at the viability of this approach.
B. Distinguishing between Rewards and Other Strategies Designed to
Influence
For the UN to harness the full potential of positive inducements, it
must be able to differentiate them from activities that it would engage
in without the expectation of gaining leverage.5 4 Also, a capacity to rec-
ognize what sets positive sanctions apart from their negative counter-
parts must exist. Perceptions and subjective assesments are likely to
loom large as gestures are characterized and categorized. As Kriesberg
has observed, "[t]he criterion for distinguishing among coercive, persua-
sive, and rewarding actions may be based (1) on the intentions of the
sender (2) the interpretations of the receiver, (3) the judgment of the
observer, (4) the purported meaning which the sender wishes the action
to have for the receiver."55 The meanings ascribed to a given gesture
are likely to multiply in cases where the entity making use of it is the
UN. Numerous actors, including states, nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), and the media, play important roles in the functioning of
this structure. Each of these parties is in a position to scrutinize trans-
actions in which it is possible that inducements are being used. Also,
the intended recipient may be composed of numerous relatively
autonomous factions. These may attach different meanings to specific
UN policies. Moreover, the entity to be influenced could be relatively
new to the international stage and lack experience in engaging in the
processes by which actors at the international level relate to each other.
the goals of the antitrust laws, individual private greed is desirable; in fact it is precisely
the state of affairs the antitrust laws are designed to maintain.").
53. See, e.g., Overcoming the Asian Economic Crisis, BANGKOK POST, Feb., 20, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 7888183 (reporting on the South Korean government's desire "to
realise economic development in harmony with the principles of democracy, a free market
economy and enhanced social justice.").
54. An example would be humanitarian gestures.
55. Louis Kriesberg, Noncoercive Inducements in U.S.-Soviet Conflicts: Ending the
Occupation of Austria and Nuclear Weapons Tests, 9 J. POL. & MIL. SOC. 1, 2 (1981).
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Thus, in a given situation, it is possible that these disputants may not
appreciate that rewards are being used.
1. Perceptions Among Relevant Decision-makers
Officials responsible for managing the international community's
response to conflicts may interpret UN efforts to settle disputes differ-
ently. For example, in the case of Cambodia, humanitarian considera-
tions, an imperative that permeates much of the UN's work, would
seem to mandate that this country receive reconstruction funds. 56
However, some policymakers involved in the settlement process were
providing rehabilitation assistance to Cambodia for entirely different
reasons. Michael W. Doyle explains:
In July 1992, US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon ex-
plained the strategy of the aid package in testimony before Congress:
'Let me say that the very resources that the international community
pledged in Tokyo provide a basis for strengthening, for hopefully, the
whole country if it opens up, but as Deputy Secretary [Lawrence] Ea-
gleburger said in Tokyo, those resources should go to those factions who
cooperate in the settlement plan, just as one form of influence. 57
2. Perceptions of the Recipient:
Interperative faultlines may divide recipients. Some may perceive
the action taken by the UN as an entitlement, thus warranting no ef-
56. Given the UN's heavy involvement in humanitarian work in the past, many
within it may be apt, due to a sort of organizational momentum, to see what really is a
reward as an extension of the UN humanitarian agenda, which means that no strings
would be attached to what is distributed. With the passage of time, however, this percep-
tion may change as the UN begins to make more use of military force to suppress conflict.
For the time being, however, the meaning of a given UN gesture is likely to be deter-
mined, in part, by the extent to which it has been traditionally undertaken for humani-
tarian reasons. Thus, deliveries of food, which if placed on a continuum of activities run-
ning from strictly humanitarian functions to more elective ones like democratization
funds, would exist at the humanitarian end. A.B. Fetherston, for example, has asserted
that "the most serious failures reported in Bosnia were accusations that the peacekeeping
force used humanitarian aid as a bargaining chip." A.B. FETHERSTON, TOWARDS A
THEORY OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 136 (1994). Historically, the provision of ba-
sic items like food has been used quite openly as an inducement strategy. For example,
John H. Herz notes that during the Allied occupation of Germany following World War II,
all individuals over 18 years of age were required to fill out forms detailing their activities
during the Nazi period. According to him, "[t]here were about 13 million people involved
and few could avoid submitting questionnaires because the receipt of food-ration coupons
was made dependent on handing them in." John H. Herz, Denazificiation and Related
Policies, reprinted in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON
WITH FORMER REGIMES 21-22 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995).
57. MICHAEL W. DOYLE, UN PEACEKEEPING IN CAMBODIA: UNTAC'S CIVIL MANDATE
65 (1995).
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forts to respond by cooperating with it or other disputants. For exam-
ple, some Somalis felt that "the international community responded
to... [the] apocalypse slowly, and when it did, it did so only in a frag-
mented manner... [This reading of the situation] alienated Somalis
and turned them against the UN even before its arrival. They felt the
international community had abandoned them."5 8 Meanwhile, similar
gestures, perhaps due to the cultural background of the recipient, will
propel it to feel obligated to take actions that materially advance the
cause of peace.
3. Perceptions among Observers
Entities observing the UN's work may view UN actions through dif-
ferent lenses. These views are likely to dovetail with their larger politi-
cal agendas or organizational raisons d'6tre. Thus, during the UN con-
flict-resolution process in Cambodia, a human rights NGO that had
earlier decried the efforts of various states to destabilize that country
might regard UN gestures toward Cambodia as a form of corrective 59 or
distributive 6o justice. Meanwhile, realist foreign policy analysts could
stress the enhanced bargaining power over the disputants that a given
strategy confers upon UN decisionmakers.
There has been little systematic examination of the conditions un-
der which the UN and spectators to UN gestures are most likely to view
conflict-resolution strategies as rewards. However, Baldwin has noted
that a recipient's response to an influence attempt will flow from its
"baseline of expectations."6 1 A reward conveyed to a party in times of
peace might elicit a totally different response if made in the midst of
war. Similarly, a pledge to suspend hostilities, if certain conditions are
first satisfied, may function as a powerful positive inducement were it
to be made while the promisee is being subjected to withering military
attacks. Moreover, it is important to recognize that a party's baseline
expectations may shift over time. Baldwin remarks:
A's offer to stop tipping the boat if B will row is unlikely to be perceived
by B as a carrot unless A actually is tipping the boat at the time the of-
fer is made. A tips the boat in order to shift B's expectation baseline,
so that B will perceive the offer to stop tipping the boat as a reward. 62
For Baldwin, "conditional influence attempts," or promises to re-
58. JARAT CHOPRA ET AL., FIGHTING FOR HOPE IN SOMALIA 30 (1995).
59. JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 355 (1992) (arguing that "an actor has a
duty in corrective justice to repair a loss only if that loss is his responsibility").
60. For a discussion of distributive justice, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
253-332 (1971).
61. Baldwin, supra note 45, at 24.
62. Id. at 25.
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ward, can be included in the range of positive sanctions that may be
utilized to modify the behavior of another party. However, the "possi-
bility that withholding a reward may be regarded by B as a punishment
tempts one to regard threats and promises as two sides of one coin." 63
Baldwin argues:
The fallacy of this line of reasoning lies in the assumption that with-
holding a reward is always a punishment... If rewards and punish-
ments (and, correspondingly, promises and threats) are defined in
terms of B's expectations at the moment A begins his influence at-
tempt, it is clear that a conditional commitment not to reward if B fails
to comply is not necessarily a threat. 'If you do not do X, I shall not
reward you' is a threat to punish if-and only if-B had a prior expec-
tation of receiving the reward.64
By assuring B that its noncompliance will go unpunished while its
compliance will be rewarded, threats can be conceptually isolated from
promises.
Theorizing about positive sanctions may provide the beginnings of
an explanation of how these gestures can be distinguished from other
UN policies. Examination of previous UN attempts to end conflicts rep-
resents another path to pursue. Reconstruction aid,65 quick impact
projects, 66 human rights technical assistance,6 7 side-payments, 68 elec-
tion monitoring support,6 9 trust funds designed to spur democratiza-
tion, 70 demobilization services, 71 demining efforts,72 the carrying out of
civil functions like policing and issuing passports 73 as well as help with
repatriation 74 have figured into UN work to address internal and inter-
national disputes. It is possible that all, or none, were conceived as a
way to influence the actions of parties.
These efforts have encountered varying degrees of success. For ex-
ample, UNITAF decisionmakers established a weapons incentive pro-
gram. F.M. Lorenz has noted:
Planners considered several incentive concepts, variations of 'food for
guns' or 'cash for guns' and evaluated the US experience with disarm-
ing the civil populace in Panama. However, Somali social and political
63. Id.
64. Id. at 26.
65. Mozambique and Cambodia
66. Cambodia
67. Cambodia and El Salvador
68. Haiti
69. Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, and Cambodia
70. Mozambique
71. Cambodia, Mozambique, and Nicaragua
72. Mozambique, Afghanistan, and Cambodia
73. Cambodia
74. Namibia, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Canbodia
1998
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
dynamics were considerably different from those encountered in Pan-
ama.... The large quantity of weapons in the region created another
challenge. There would be little incentive for the bandits to turn in
their best weapons, and the program potentially would have disarmed
the hungry people who needed protection from the bandits. A cash-for-
weapons program also would have run the risk of creating more crime
by encouraging bandits to steal weapons to turn in, or providing incen-
tives for arms dealers to import more weapons from other parts of East
Africa. An informal, small-scale weapons incentive program was used
during the third week in January when UNITAF Marine forces began
giving a receipt for the turn-in of weapons or for information on where
to find weapons. These receipts were then exchanged for bags of wheat
provided by the humanitarian relief organizations. This informal pro-
gram was never expanded beyond a single sector of Mogadishu, how-
ever, and it had [a] limited effect on the number of weapons in circula-
tion. In late January, a decision was made by the UNITAF
Commander not to implement a nationwide weapons incentive pro-
gram.7
5
This tack, formulated and implemented by a subcontracting
authority, was ad-hoc. Its framers hoped to push forward one aspect of
the process that was designed to pacify Somalia, namely disarma-
ment. 76 The designers of the weapons incentive scheme attempted to
influence a relatively large cohort of players. 7
Several months before the inauguration of the UNITAF disarma-
ment program, the sides in the war in Mozambique were concluding the
Rome Accords, an agreement that was designed to serve as the basis for
this country's transition from war to peace.7 8 One of the components of
this instrument certified that the Mozambican National Resistance
(RENAMO):
as a partner in the peace process, was entitled to financial assistance
for the process of transforming itself from a military organization into
75. F. M. Lorenz, Law and Anarchy in Somalia, PARAMETERS, Winter 1993, at 27, 31.
76. See, e.g., Robert G. Patman, Disarming Somalia: the Contrasting Fortunes of
United States and Australian Peacekeepers During United Nations Intervention, 1992-
1993, 96 AFR. AFF. 509 (1997), ("The initial American focus on voluntary disarmament in
Mogadishu brought several small-scale weapons incentive programs to the fore. Varia-
tions of the 'food for guns' and 'cash for guns' concepts were considered.").
77. Patman, for example, implies that this was the case when he notes that "[g]iven
the large quantity of weapons, any 'weapons for cash' plan in Mogadishu faced enormous
difficulties. For one thing, it would have been prohibitively expensive." Patman, supra
note 76, at 509.
78. See General Peace Agreement for Mozambique. Letter Dated 6 October 1992
from Mozambique to the Secretary-General, Transmitting a Letter from President Joa-
quin Chissano of Mozambique Requesting the Participation of the United Nations in
Monitoring the General Peace Agreement, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND MOZAMBIQUE:
1992-1995 at 111 (Dep't of Public Information ed., 1995) [hereinafter' General Peace
Agreement].
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a political party.... The Peace Agreement stipulated that the Mozam-
bique Government would provide the financing and, if lacking the nec-
essary means, could appeal to the international community, in par-
ticular to Italy. The United Nations Trust Fund for the
Implementation of the Peace Agreement in Mozambique, established in
1993, was the main instrument for this critical task. Its creation was
one of the most innovative feature of the Mozambique operation and
was a pivotal factor in maintaining the momentum of the peace process
at this stage.79
Unlike the Somali weapons incentive strategy, the trust fund
emerged from a comprehensive political settlement. The UN played a
direct role in its creation although a separate authority implemented
this initiative. Moreover, the targets of this program were a small
group of actors, the leadership of RENAMO. Decisionmakers tied this
reward, if it indeed can be called that, to progress by this group on the
realization of all of the objectives codified in the Mozambique settle-
ment, not just a particular subset of the process to normalize conditions
in this country.8 0
Although stark, the differences between the Somali and Mozam-
bique programs do not, by themselves, prove anything definitive about
the inherent superiority of the latter strategy over the former. Addi-
tionally, the UN's activities in Mozambique, which were carried out un-
der the auspices of the UN Operation in Mozambique nearly ended in
disaster.8 1 Thus, it would be foolish to argue that the employment of
positive inducements always represents a viable overall strategy for the
UN to pursue in its attempts to end conflicts. Rather, in many cases,
decisionmakers may opt for a more multifaceted approach; one that
synthesizes positive and negative approaches could be used. A host of
considerations should provide answers to questions such as who ought
to be rewarded, when positive sanctions can be used and what form the
inducements should assume. Part III attempts to identify and discuss
the range of concerns that might arise as reward-based strategies are
pursued.
IV. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UN REWARDS: CONSIDERATIONS THAT
79. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Introduction, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND MOZAMBIQUE:
1992-1995 at 1, 58-59 (Dep't of Public Information ed., 1995).
80. See Letter Dated 14 January 1994 from the Secretary-General to Carlo Azeglio
Ciampi, President of the Council of Ministers of Italy, Requesting a Contribution to the
United Nations Trust Fund for Assistance to RENAMO, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
MOZAMBIQUE: 1992-1995, at 216 (Dep't of Public Information ed., 1995) (declaring that the
"monthly allowance [received by RENAMO] would be tied to scrupulous implementation
of the [the Mozambican] peace agreement .. ") [hereinafter Letter Dated].
81. See Bill Keller, Mozambique Vote Thrown Into Doubt, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 28, 1994,
at B7 (reporting that "main opposition leader cast the entire exercise into doubt with a
last-minute announcement that he will reject the outcome").
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A. Institutional Sophistication and Coordination Needed to Utilize
Positive Inducements:
To tap into the power of rewards, the UN may need to reinvent it-
self institutionally. It has been argued that organizations with rela-
tively simple institutional arrangements can make effective use of posi-
tive sanctions. Baldwin, for example, has asserted that "when A's
influence attempt is based on a promise, B's compliance obligates A to
respond with a reward, whereas B's failure to comply call for no further
response from A."s2 Similarly, Lawson attempts to account for the use
of positive sanctions by the Gulf Cooperation Council to end the Iran-
Iraq War in 1982. He has observed:
Positive sanctions are especially well-suited to those countries that
have poorly developed foreign policy-making institutions or that have
difficulty carrying out sustained foreign policy programs.... There is
thus little that can be carried out in the way of long-range contingency
planning and international developments can for the most part be
monitored only sporadically. States such as these have a strong incen-
tive to find ways to carry out their interests that do not require the
adoption of complex or high-risk policies. Offering rewards for acqui-
escing in one's demands provides a way of using a minimal degree of
state organizational resources most efficiently in dealing with other
countries. 83
Lawson also contends that international organizations, in particu-
lar, are apt to make ample use of rewards to influence the actions of
disputants. He argues:
To the extent that an actor is predisposed to deal with co-operation
rather than with conflict as a general rule, using rewards to achieve
policy objectives will be an obvious diplomatic maneuver. Thus institu-
tional arrangements designed to facilitate co-operation among coun-
tries should also be more likely to develop plans that involve positive
sanctions. In other words, international organizations should make
more use of reward-based foreign policy programs than individual
countries do.8 4
Surprisingly, with the UN's emergence as a more active participant
in the settlement of conflicts following the end of the Cold War, coercive
measures emerged as one of the first strategies this organization em-
82. Baldwin, supra note 45, at 28.
83. Lawson, supra note 48, at 315.
84. Id. at 317.
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braced to deal with recalcitrant disputants.8 5 It has also become appar-
ent that for the UN to construct a package of rewards to gain leverage
over the parties to a conflict, interaction among several facets of the UN
may be required. In some contexts, it may be important to ensure the
harmonization of the activities of a varied cast of characters. These in-
clude Secretariat departments, 86 specialized agencies and UN pro-
grammes,8 7 and international financial institutions (IFIs).88 Touval has
highlighted the importance of UN collaboration transcending burea-
cratic boundaries:
Part of the U.N. problem is that it has no readily accessible military
[for the utilization of coercive measures] or economic resources [for
positive inducements] of its own. It is entirely dependent on member
states or at least some of them, to provide the resources necessary for a
successful mediation. The United Nations cannot even harness the as-
sets of financial and trading institutions. Doing so depends yet again
on the decisions of member states. A U.N. mediator cannot commit the
International Monetary Fund or World Bank to provide credit to reluc-
tant disputants. While U.N. member states might theoretically be able
to pool their resources and enhance the organization's bargaining
power, that type of cooperation seldom comes about. Governments are
usually reluctant to commit resources to such a venture, negotiations
for such commitments are slow and cumbersome, and the resources
states do make available are often inadequate. 89
Coordination difficulties plague the work of the UN. Alvaro de Soto
and Graciana del Castillo have described the communication break-
down that occurred between the UN and IFIs as each devised a recon-
struction and rehabilitation strategy for El Salvador, which was
emerging from years of civil war:
El Salvador's case illustrated the lack of transparency and coordination
within the U.N. system as the [International Monetary Fund] IMF and
the [World] Bank did not keep the U.N. abreast of the economic pro-
gram they sponsor, and the U.N. neglected to inform the Bretton
Woods institutions of the peace accords. It was as if a patient lay on
85. During one of the first major UN peace operations, the Namibian venture, deci-
sionmakers confronted this problem. See, e.g., Adrien Wing et al., Southern Africa: Pros-
pects for Peace?, 83 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 350, 351 (1989) ("UNTAG arrived at an un-
precedented decision. Before even dispatching its own investigative team or acquiring any
independent verification of the facts, UNTAG's head, Mr. Ahtisaari, authorized the re-
lease of certain units of the South African military from their restriction to base in order
to engage the SWAPO combatants").
86. Examples would include the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO)
and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA).
87. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and World Food Program
(WFP) function as illustrations.
88. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are both examples.
89. Touval, supra note 7, at 52.
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the operating table with the left and right sides of his body separated
by a curtain and unrelated surgery being performed on each side.90
However, UNTAC's experience suggests that limited UN/IFI coop-
eration is possible. 9 1 Similarly, at the regional level, there is a prece-
dent for collaboration between the Organization of American States
(OAS) and the Inter-American Development Bank.92
Lack of coordination sometimes even characterizes the interaction
of various agencies within the Secretariat. Erskine Childers noted that
"[t]here is no intergovernmental assembly or council of the UN system
as a whole. Its main linkage, therefore, is through its senior civil ser-
vants in the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination [ACC], chaired
by the Secretary-General. This is a very weak link."93 Several years
ago, the ACC was meeting only twice a year and key members of it were
not required to attend. Rather, "all agency heads, having been elected
in a different governing body, have the legal right to claim that their
agencies' policies are 'sovereign."' 94 This fragmentation could deprive
the UN of the ability to take advantage of the promise of positive sanc-
tions. Kriesberg, has emphasized the importance of undertaking efforts
to lay the political groundwork for an influence attempt. According to
him, "[iln initiating de-escalation, positive sanctions are more likely to
be effective if preceded by communications about the desirability of con-
ciliatory gestures and de-escalating negotiations than if there are no
such communications."95 Thus, for positive inducement to be effective,
90. Alvaro de Soto & Graciana del Castillo, Obstacles to Peacebuilding, FOREIGN
POL'Y, Spring 1994, at 74.
91. For example, James A. Schear has noted that "UNTAC benefited greatly from
having World Bank personnel involved in the management of its financial oversight and
rehabilitative programmes. Still, it proved difficult to obtain swift action by the IFIs."
Schear, supra note 39, at 263.
92. L. Ronald Scheman and John W. Ford cite the way a dispute between Brazil,
Paraguay, and Argentina over the use of the Parana and de la Plata rivers during the late
1960s was handled by these two institutions. According to them, "they helped lay the
groundwork for large hydroelectric installations, but the bank would not finance them
unless the countries resolved the disputes capable of disrupting the venture." Ronald
Scheman & John W. Ford, The Organization of American States as Mediator, in
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 197, 199 (Saadia Touval & I. Wil-
liam Zartman eds., 1985).
93. ERSKINE CHILDERS, RENEWING THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM 31 (1994).
94. Id. Boutros-Ghali's successor, Kofi A. Annan, established a Policy Coordination
Group during the first year of his tenure as UN Secretary-General. This body consists of
"department heads and senior officials [and was] created to improve communication, co-
operation and coordination among the Secretariat, the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations
Population Fund (UNFPA)." Kofi A. Annan, Strengthening United Nations Action .in the
Field of Human Rights: Prospects and Priorities, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS J. 1, 6 (1997). It is
unclear whether this body has enhanced the UN's ability to react to a given situation in
an orchestrated manner.
95. Louis Kriesberg, Carrots, Sticks, De-escalation: U.S.-Soviet and Arab-Israeli Rela-
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minimal synchronization between the UN's political or public affairs
components and the agency or agencies actually delivering the reward
may be needed.
Coordination concerns may arise as peace operations attempt to
use positive inducements. To reward a given party, several UN agencies
might need to act in concert while maintaining close contacts with the
political arm of the operation. At best, peace ventures have a mixed re-
cord of integrating their activities. US Secretary of State Madeleine K.
Albright has criticized the failure of UN humanitarian relief organiza-
tions to mount coordinated efforts. Anecdotal evidence from different
operations supports her gloomy assessment.96 Although the Depart-
ment of Humanitarian Affairs was established to function as a mecha-
nism to coordinate aid efforts, its writ does not run long enough to actu-
ally bring this about, Albright has charged.97
Effective collaboration between humanitarian, political, and mili-
tary activities has eluded some peace operations. Although the political
and military components of UNITAF were able to operationalize excel-
lent cooperation, this came to an abrupt halt when the hand-off to
UNOSOM II was complete.98 According to one commentary on the UN's
involvement in Somalia, the "Political Division was completely in the
dark. Between 7 May and 9 October 1993 there were no relations be-
tween the political and military side of UNOSOM."99 Similarly, during
the Cambodian UN venture:
tions, 13 ARMED FORCES & SOC'Y 403, 420 (1987).
96. Albright Accuses UN Aid Agencies of Turf Wars, Reuters News Serv., Nov. 2,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. At the same time, examples of lim-
ited coordination exist. As Fetherston has asserted, "in Cyprus and Cambodia, [the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] UNHCR worked closely with the
peacekeeping force. In Namibia, one of the designated tasks of the peacekeepers who re-
mained until independence was to write detailed situation reports for the incoming
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)." FETHERSTON, supra note 56, at 135.
97. In Mozambique:
All U.N., government, and non-governmental relief efforts operate under the
umbrella of the U.N. Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination
(UNOHAC), providing the coordination and balance that earlier missions
have lacked .... In Mozambique, even programs that seem military have
been handled as humanitarian issues. If UNOHAC succeeds, it could lead to
increasing emphasis on humanitarian work, ending the recent dominance of
the military component of U.N. missions.
Jim Wurst, Mozambique Disarms. BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 36.
98. Susan R. Lamb has noted:
complex problems of coordination has arisen within [the United Nations Pro-
tection Force] UNPROFOR due to its mix of military and civilian functions.
The military-civilian interface in Bosnia, whereby the UNHCR has acted as
the 'lead agency,' has highlighted the need for strengthened coordination and
planning between the military and humanitarian components of the mission.
Lamb, supra note 27, at 78.
99. CHOPRA, supra note 58, at 91.
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Most decision making was organized on a component-by-component ba-
sis, without sufficient procedures for sharing of information and coor-
dination of response. Aside from thrice-weekly staff meetings and the
later 'action cell' (composed of [Deputy Special Representative Behrooz)
Sadry and the heads of components) to make recommendations on
measures against the SOC [State of Cambodia], UNTAC lacked a
transparent intercomponent coordination process, and component
heads acted very independently.100
Enhancing overall UN coordination is an item that should top any
reform agenda for this organization. In fact, until decisionmakers re-
alize this goal, the UN's ability to design and deliver rewards will be de-
termined, in part, by the number of agencies whose participation in the
strategy is required. Its capacity to utilize positive inducement strate-
gies will also depend on how closely the different aspects of the UN will
have to work together. Thus, for the present, it would appear that ges-
tures relying on measures that are relatively simple to execute are more
viable than positive sanctions requiring the cooperation of a large num-
ber of actors in the Secretariat, among IFIs, and agencies working at
the field level.
B. The Politics of UN Rewards
1. Debate over Inducements at the Domestic Level
In some situations, popular opinion may make the use of rewards
difficult. Thus, the UN would do well to be sensitive to how pressure
groups in various national jurisdictions are likely to regard using posi-
tive sanctions. As Kriesberg has noted:
Government leaders generally avoid making a bold conciliatory move
toward an adversary. It is likely they believe they are susceptible to
charges of having yielded to the enemy, of appeasement, and of cow-
ardliness. This could have greater effect in societies where the public
plays a significant role in the selection of heads of government. If so,
leaders of nondemocratic countries may be in a better position than
leaders of democratic ones to proffer major conciliatory gestures ....
This helps explain the use of major conciliatory gestures by [Egyptian
leader Anwar] Sadat in 1977 and [Soviet leader Nikita S.] Khrushchev
in the mid-1950's.10 1
Compared to an institution like the US Congress or the European
Parliament, the UN is relatively insulated from popular pressures.
Many of its members, including two permanent members of the Secu-
100. RATNER, supra note 8, at 196.
101. Kriesberg, supra note 95, at 412.
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rity Council, are either not democracies or occupy some twilight zone
between authoritarianism and the maintenance of popularly-elected
governing institutions. Since public opinion in these countries counts
for relatively little, it would appear that the UN must be mainly con-
cerned that its approaches to settling conflicts enjoy the support of im-
portant constituencies in the democratic members of the Security Coun-
cil.
Among many advanced democratic nations, it is relatively impor-
tant that UN policies are supported at the grassroots as well as the
government level.102 Popular perceptions of the UN's work matter more
in these countries, from which the lion's share of this organization's
funding originates. These states also supply the UN with much of its
capacity to carry out complicated peace operations and robust enforce-
ment efforts. If popular opinion in these countries takes issue with UN
strategies, politicians may attempt to score points with their constitu-
ents by providing as little cooperation with the UN as possible. 103 Nev-
ertheless, the electorates of many democracies have generally been
willing to defer to the expert judgments of those who inhabit their gov-
ernment's foreign policy-making arm. The US polity keeps its represen-
tatives on a relatively short foreign policy leash. However, few elections
hinge on a particular international affairs issue or function solely as a
referendum on an administration's handling of international rela-
tions. 1 04
Given the deference normally accorded foreign policy determina-
tions, the UN might use a wide array of positive inducements without
incurring serious political risks. However, meaningful predictions about
the popularity of many UN policies may be hard to generate. It is even
possible that a given undertaking will fail to register on the radar
screens of influential domestic groups. The American electorate, 105 for
example, continues to be relatively receptive to the idea of a major UN
102. See Kofi Annan, Peace-Keeping in Situations of Civil War, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 623, 625 (1994) ("Without sustained political and popular support, it is not possible
to give a mission the sense of strength and continuity that it needs to attain its goals.").
103. This is the stance that many members of the US Congress have adopted toward
the United Nations. For more on this subject, see Carolyn J. Logan, U.S. Public Opinion
and the Intervention in Somalia: Lessons for the Future of Military-Humanitarian Inter-
ventions 20 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 155 (1996).
104. Even Ted Koppel, an American journalist, may have overestimated the role that
international relations plays in the US political equation when he noted that "[s]ome
shrewd political observer once noted that snow removal is to local politics what foreign
policy is to the president. It won't get you elected, but it can get you fired." Nightline
(ABC television broadcast, Jan. 12, 1996).
105. Because the US is the world's sole economic and military superpower, it is crucial
that UN undertakings enjoy American support. The discussion in this Article on how
positive sanctions might be received by important political constituencies is limited to the
US.
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role in conflict-resolution.1o 6 However, vocal portions of the same elec-
torate are convinced that the UN lies at the heart of a giant conspiracy
to strip the US of its sovereignty. 107 In light of the military debacle in
Somalia, some Americans have rejected the idea of US military person-
nel serving under foreign commanders in UN peace operations. 0 8 How-
ever, for strategies relying exclusively on positive sanctions, states
would not need to contribute military assets to make them operational.
Some US observers characterizes the UN as an inefficient, bloated
bureaucracy that is unable to mobilize or utilize resources efficiently.
Making use of positive inducements will, of course, require funds. The
rewards themselves will come at a price. Moreover, the task of distrib-
uting them, especially if they must be dispersed among a relatively
large number of actors, might carry a hefty price tag. Ensuring that the
recipients of UN rewards use these appropriately will also consume re-
sources. In keeping with public skepticism regarding UN efficiency, the
cost of implementing positive sanctions might cause some to question
their use. 10 9
The popularity of UN inducement strategies may be linked to per-
ceptions of the actor to be influenced. For example, some commentators
questioned the US decision to allow military leaders of Haiti during the
early 1990s to escape punishment and gracefully exit the country.
Washington employed this strategy after President Bill Clinton, in an
attempt to build up popular support for an American invasion of that
country, "evoked human rights in Haiti, speaking of a 'campaign of
rape, torture, and mutilation,' under Mr. Cedras." 11° Similarly, a
106. In an article on the results of a Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) poll
on American attitudes toward foreign affairs, Kermit Lanser has noted:
Only 19% of the American people feel that the U.S. should refuse to join a
United Nations peacekeeping force in a troubled part of the world; they are
evenly split (44% to 45%) on whether U.S. troops should serve under a U.N.-
appointed commander; and 65% think it would be best for the country if 'we
take an active part in world affairs.'
Kermit Lanser, Taking an Attitude on Foreign Affairs, FIN. WORLD, Apr. 25, 1995, at 80.
John E. Rielly, meanwhile, reported that 51% of Americans favor a strengthened United
Nations according to the CFR poll. John E. Rielly, The Public Mood at Mid-Decade,
FOREIGN POL'Y, Spring 1995, at 76, 82.
107. See, e.g., Tom Bethell, Patterns of Conspiracy: Intricate Yarns of Secret Meetings
and Insidious Plots Unravel when the Right Thread is Pulled, NAT'L REV., Aug. 28, 1995,
at 33.
108. See, e.g., Zaire Proceed with Caution, FLA. TIMES UNION (Jacksonville), NOV. 15,
1996, at A14 ("Also the [planned Zaire] mission will be headed by a Canadian general,
and that could cause some dissension-particularly if some U.S. soldiers are killed-be-
cause many Americans are queasy about having their troops under foreign command.").
109. See, e.g., Rob Lever, As UN Role Expands, US Grows More Reluctant to Pay Bills,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, May 21, 1995, available in 1995 WL 7819605 ("The United
States withdrew a decade ago from the UN educational and cultural organization
UNESCO because of concerns over waste and anti-Americanism.").
110. The Nightmare Next Door: America Hopes to Give Haiti a New Stable, Demo-
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promise of rewards to the United Somali Congress (USC), even if it had
taken confidence-building measures in the wake of the October 1993
raid that spawned numerous American casualties, would probably have
provoked howls of protest in the US. After all, it was USC followers
who dragged bodies of American servicemen through the streets of
Mogadishu."'
Because disputants like Cedras and the USC became part of the US
mainstream political debate, limits were imposed on how the UN could
deal with them. Once this occurred, Washington's blessing would be
needed before the UN could have embarked on any new initiative to
bring about a resolution in either conflict. These constraints simply do
not exist when the US is not deeply involved in a dispute. Neither are
they tangible when the UN has not become embroiled in a bitter, per-
sonalized conflict with one of the disputants. Of course, both of these
conditions, which tend to attract intense media scrutiny, existed in So-
malia during 1993.
In some situations, it seems likely that the public will be indifferent
about the substance of UN technqiues to end disputes. For example, key
US decisionmakers had adopted a posture of benign neglect with regard
to the conflict in Mozambique. Also, the UN chose not to become in-
volved in a heated dispute with RENAMO. These dynamics may explain
the lack of public controversy surrounding the decision to provide posi-
tive inducements to RENAMO even though it bears responsibility for
particularly flagrant violations of international humanitarian law.112
Given the relative novelty of peace operations, the UN's impulse to
assess various ways of carrying out conflict-resolution ventures is un-
derstandable. One observer has even characterized Somalia as a "labo-
ratory for new theories of U.N. peace-keeping."" 3 Such experimenta-
cratic Government. Two Centuries of History Are Ranged Against It, ECONOMIST, Sept.
24, 1994, at 19. This periodical characterized the deal as "perplexing to many by virtue of
the generous treatment it promised to Mr. Cedras." Id.
111. See HIRSCH & OAKLEY, supra note 18, at 127 (noting that "the degrading treat-
ment of a U.S. soldier's body, dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, shown repeat-
edly on American televisions, fueled public outrage and revulsion").
112. What these funds are used to buy may also prove controversial to taxpayers,
many of them Italian, due to the extent to which Rome contributed funds that went to as-
sist RENAMO. Christina Lamb has noted that "fa]ny self-respecting guerrilla leader
turned politician needs a wardrobe of Italian suits, a state-of-the-art bullet-proof Mer-
cedes, a multi-million dollar allowance and a whitewashed villa overlooking a palm-
fringed bay." Christina Lamb, UN Pays Pounds 390m for Mozambique poll, SUNDAY
TIMES, Oct. 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, English Non-US File.
113. Chester A. Crocker, The Lessons of Somalia, FOREIGN AFF., May-June 1995, at 2,
4. Ultimately, the heavy American involvement in this country cut both ways. On one
hand, the US forces brought with them some of the finest weaponry, logistical support,
and training in the world. From a purely military standpoint, UNITAF and the American
forces pledged to support UNOSOM II had the capacity to pursue a more dynamic ap-
proach to the conflict than any other peace operation force ever constituted with the pos-
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tion, however, may be dangerous if the UN has become involved in a
war of words with one of the disputants or if one of the great powers,
particularly the US, has become actively engaged in the management of
the conflict.
2. UN Pressure Groups
NGOs may oppose efforts to reward disputants. Since the early
1990s, these groups have begun to play a more influential role in UN
affairs."1 4 NGO support has helped push through a number of UN re-
forms. However, many of these same organizations, especially human
rights NGOs, have condemned the UN for its response to various con-
flict situations.115 These groups fault the UN for not being tough
enough with uncooperative parties or those responsible for egregious
human rights violations. For example, an Asia Watch report assessing
the progress of UNTAC concluded:
Standing up to the Khmer Rouge and the Phonn Penh government
early on, in particular, might have prevented the escalation of violence
that came later. A clear determination to act firmly, decisively, pub-
licly and quickly against abusive officials and party cadres might have
sible exception of the NATO Implementation (IFOR) and Stabilization (SFOR) Forces cur-
rently in the Balkans. On the other, the very presence of American troops in that country
precipitated heavy press coverage of the conflict and meant it would receive intense con-
gressional scrutiny. This meant that certain options that might have been utilized were
foreclosed at the outset due to domestic political constraints.
114. Their representatives routinely attend and even address intergovernmental con-
ferences. NGO forums held parallel to UN gatherings have become events in themselves
and the sources of important proposals for restructuring and reinventing the UN. See Pe-
ter J. Spiro, New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International
Decision-Making Institutions, WASH. Q., Winter 1995, at 45.
115. The impetus for some of this criticism has been the actions of UN personnel, espe-
cially troops attached to peace operations, who are alleged to have committed human
rights or other criminal offenses. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PEACE-KEEPING AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (1994); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE LOST AGENDA AND U.N. FIELD
OPERATIONS (1993). At the same time, NGOs have condemned the posture that the UN
has adopted toward various disputants. See AMERICA'S WATCH, PEACE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: SUCCESSES AND FAILINGS OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN EL
SALVADOR (1992); ASIA WATCH, AN EXCHANGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND PEACE-KEEPING IN
CAMBODIA (1993); ASIA WATCH, CAMBODIA: HUMAN RIGHTS BEFORE AND AFTER THE
ELECTIONS (1993); see also Brian D. Tittemor, Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying In-
ternational Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peace Operations, 33 STAN. J. INT'L L.
61 (1997). Meanwhile, in Mozambique, human rights NGOs criticized the UN for hiring
mine manufacturers whose products litter this country to carry out demining activities.
Overmined: Mozambique, ECONOMIST, June 11, 1994, at 40. For articles stressing the
need for vigorous human rights monitoring efforts to be built into the efforts that the UN
undertakes to end conflicts, especially those where massive denials of human rights were
previously the norm, see IAN JOHNSTONE, RIGHTS AND RECONCILIATION: UN STRATEGIES
IN EL SALVADOR 21 (1995); Ian Martin, Haiti: Mangled Multilateralism, FOREIGN POL'Y,
Summer 1994, at 72, 87.
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acted as a deterrent to further killings, disappearances, arbitrary ar-
rests, abusive detention practices, intimidation and harassment.116
Additionally, many NGOs have lobbied for the establishment of in-
ternational criminal tribunals to prosecute individuals violating inter-
national humanitarian law and human rights norms. 117 They also have
been consistent backers of the establishment of a permanent interna-
tional criminal court.118
Humanitarian NGOs may be particularly sensitive about the way
in which the UN interacts with the parties to a conflict. In Somalia,
UNOSOM II decisionmakers rejected a weapons incentive program be-
cause of the opposition by NGOs that it was likely to engender. Clem-
ent Adibe has noted:
mhe Director of Humanitarian Relief in Somalia had notified the
Force Command that the concept of providing factional militia with
cash and other incentives was not 'supportable.' The apparent reason
for the disapproval was that many donor agencies believed that the
original UNITAF idea was morally repugnant because it amounted to
rewarding the militias and the warlords for their brutality toward So-
malis.'19
Thus, UN reward strategies may encounter stiff opposition from
the NGO community.
C. Monitoring the Activities of the Disputant(s) to be Influenced
Positive sanctions may allow the UN to cut down on its monitoring
responsibilities. Baldwin has observed:
Influence attempts based solely on negative sanctions provide B with
no incentive to comply with A's demands if B can find a way to avoid
detection. This fact, together with the relative difficulty of legitimizing
influence attempts based on negative sanctions, means that A must
spend more on specialized machinery for monitoring B's activities when
he uses negative instead of positive sanctions. 120
116. ASIA WATCH, CAMBODIA: HUMAN RIGHTS BEFORE AND AFTER THE ELECTIONS 37
(1993).
117. The parties to be prosecuted included the Khmer Rouge, the Bosnian Serbs, the
Haitian junta that came to power following its 1991 coup, and the Rwandans responsible
for the 1994 civil strife in that country.
118. See Amnesty International, The Quest for Justice: Time for a Permanent Interna-
tional Criminal Court, FOCUS, Sept. 1995, at 1.
119. Clement Adibe, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Managing
Arms in Peace Processes, at 87-88, U.N. Doc. UNIDIR/95/30, U.N. Sales No. GV.E.95.0.20
(1995).
120. Baldwin, supra note 45, at 35.
1998
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Monitoring, as an activity, forms part of the core functions that the
UN often carries out when attempting to reconstruct shattered socie-
ties. For example, military personnel taking part in a peacekeeping op-
eration could report cease fire violations. Meanwhile, multidimensional
peacebuilding ventures may address such issues as repatriation, demo-
bilization, and the organization of elections. In this context, the UN
will need to evaluate the extent to which steps are being taken by each
of the parties to make progress on multiple fronts.121 Even in those rare
situations where all of the disputants realize that it is in their long-
term interests to comply, monitoring is imperative. Each party will
need reassurances that the others are actually upholding their ends of
the bargain. Where efforts to evade the UN's scrutiny are rife, even
more individuals will be required. Past operations have suffered from a
shortage of personnel to evaluate compliance. As Paul F. Diehl has con-
tended:
The enormous area that [the United Nations Transitional Assistance
Group] UNTAG had to cover proved problematical. UNTAG was often
unable to verify that South African forces had been confined to their
bases, relinquished their weapons or released political prisoners. In
some cases, the South African forces moved troops, weapons and pris-
oners from location to location several steps ahead of the peacekeeping
forces which could not monitor the whole country. The UN Transi-
tional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) had similar difficulties in
monitoring the military activities of the Khmer Rouge. 122
Unfortunately, tight budgets continue to constrain the ability of the
UN to engage personnel in monitoring capacities. 123 Positive sanctions,
it can be argued, actually lessen the need for monitoring efforts to be
undertaken. After all, rewards may induce parties to cooperate more
readily with UN efforts. Thus, their employment would seem to emerge
as a particularly effective way for the UN to carry out its peace opera-
tions while making efficient use of scarce resources. However, these
savings might be offset by the cost of ensuring that the rewards distrib-
uted to the parties are used appropriately by them. It would also ap-
pear that these efforts may be relatively costly in situations where the
121. See, e.g., Stephen Baranyi & Sean Loughna, Guatemala at the Crossroads, JANE'S
INTELLIGENCE REV. Oct. 1, 1995, at 472, available in 1995 WL 14357421 ("Finally, the
parties requested the establishment of an on-site UN Verification Mission to ensure im-
mediate compliance with these [human rights] commitments.").
122. Paul F. Diehl, Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, in A CRISIS OF EXPECTATIONS: UN
PEACEKEEPING IN THE 1990S 223, 229 (Ramesh Thakur & Carlyle A. Thayer eds., 1995).
123. See IraqKuwait-UN to Reduce Border Monitoring Force, PERISCOPE-DAILY DEF.
NEWS CAPSULES, Aug. 6, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7601585 ("The United Nations will
cut its military observer force on the Iraq-Kuwait border by 20 percent by April 1997 due
to financial problems, the commander of the force said in remarks published on Tues-
day.").
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inducement being distributed takes the form of monetary payments. 124
D. Propriety of the Influence Attempt
An important aspect of using reward-based strategies is ensuring
that these measures comply with all relevant regulations and norms.
However, due to the relatively small number of attempts by interna-
tional actors to use inducements, there are few rules or customs gov-
erning their employment. Meanwhile, an entire legal regime has grown
up around the conduct of war, a staple of conventional statecraft. 12
5
Still, it can be argued that some standards regulating the use of re-
wards exist. At a minimum, the use of such inducement strategies
should be consistent with UN rules, UN values, and its operational ob-
jectives.
1. UN Rules
Some attempts to use rewards have violated, or, had they not been
implemented by another entity, would have contravened UN regula-
tions. For example, Virginia Page Fortna has noted that during the
Second United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II),
"[t]he UN World Food Program [WFP] made an exception to its rule of
not supplying military forces, and agreed to take over the job of feeding
Angolan troops."'126 This measure was taken to spur demobilization.
Similarly, the UN asked Italy to finance aspects of RENAMO's electoral
preparations. A UN-administered fund could not be set up because "the
United Nations rules under which Trust Funds are administered are
124. For example, the formulation of accounting procedures would be a transaction
cost associated with such an endeavor. Actually implementing them would consume more
resources. The accounting issue has been raised in the contect of UN peacekeeping opera-
tions. See UN: Streamlined Peace-keeping, Rapid Liquidation of Missions Called for in
Admin & Budgetary Commitee Part 2, M2 PRESSWIRE, Nov. 8, 1996, available in 1996 WL
14652859 ("With the Brindisi Base playing a pivotal role in receiving and deploying assets
to and from field missions, the maintenance of a comprehensive central inventory for all
operations will be critical, the Secretary-General states in his report on the management
of peace-keeping assets: policy, technique and accounting issues.").
125. See generally United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious
or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, U.N. Doc. AICONF./95/15, reprinted in
19 I.L.M. 1523 (1980); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. For other instru-
ments regulating the conduct of armed hostilities, see W. MICHAEL REISMAN & CHRIS T.
ANTANIOU, THE LAWS OF WAR (1994).
126. Virginia Page Fortna, United Nations Angola Verification Mission II, in THE
EVOLUTION OF UN PEACEKEEPING: CASE STUDIES AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 388, 399
(William J. Durch ed., 1993).
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too rigid to meet the needs which stem from the transformation of a
military organization into a political party, all the more so in the social
and economic context of an African country."127 Rome later agreed to
comply with this request. 128 Because countries like Italy will sometimes
be unwilling to carry out such tasks, the rules governing some UN ac-
tivities may need to be changed. Greater flexibility may maximize the
possibility that rewards will induce the disputants in a given conflict to
make peace.
2. UN Values
With the UN's emergence on to the world political stage as an in-
fluential actor, how it intervenes in a given context has become an issue
of greater importance. For example, many believe that UN agents, in-
cluding mediators and peace operations personnel, ought to "maintain
their neutrality and perform their mission in an impartial manner."'129
Similarly, UN military commanders speak of resisting the urge to cross
the "Mogadishu line."' 3 0 However, it has become increasingly difficult
for this organization to be perceived as impartial as its involvement
with the parties to a conflict expands and deepens.' 3' As Steven R.
Ratner has noted, "[b]ecause the UN acts as administrator, mediator,
127. See Letter Dated, supra note 80, at 216.
128. Letter Dated 4 March 1994 from the President of the Council of Ministers of Italy
to the Secretary-General on Italy's Further Contribution in the United Nations Trust
Fund, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND MOZAMBIQUE: 1992-1995, at 230 (Dep't of Public In-
formation ed., 1995).
129. Diehl, supra note 122, at 224. But see Richard K. Betts, The Delusion of Impar-
tial Intervention, FOREIGN AFF. Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 20 (arguing that impartiality "becomes
a destructive misconception when carried over to the messier realm of 'peace enforce-
ment,' where the belligerents have yet to decide that they have nothing more to gain by
fighting").
130. This term was coined by Sir Michael Rose, a British military officer who served as
commander of UNPROFOR. He insisted that UN forces never become involved in the
hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a combatant. See, e.g., Louis Meixler, U.N. in Soma-
lia: Humanitarian Success, Military Failure, AP, Feb. 24, 1995, available in 1995 WL
4364135 (reporting that "the former commander of U.N. forces, Lt. Gen. Sir Michael Rose,
has often cautioned against taking aggressive action there, warning that peacekeepers
must not cross what he has calls 'the Mogadishu line,' separating peacekeeping and war-
fare.").
131. Sometimes, events seemingly outside the UN's control thwart its intentions to act
as an impartial participant in the conflict-resolution process. As Robert G. Patman has
noted:
In mid-June 1992, a Russian Antonov plane with UN markings delivered
military hardware and newly printed Somali currency to [United Somali
Congress (USC) leader] Ali Mahidi's airfield in north Mogadishu. The UN
had no ready explanation for this highly-disruptive blunder which prompted
an already suspicious [Somali National Alliance (SNA) leader General Mo-
hamed Farah] Aideed to accuse the UN of favoring his arch-rival.
Patman, supra note 29, at 90. Apparently, this aircraft had been previously leased to the
WFP and its UN markings were not removed after this agency no longer needed it.
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and guarantor, it is pulled by forces not present in the earlier opera-
tions."132
If the UN managed a conflict in a way that consistently tended to
support one of the parties, its impartiality would be seriously under-
mined. 133 However, taking "a stance vis-a-vis one party in response to a
specific action, rather than through any predisposition" is justifiable. 134
Thus, the UN could target positive inducements at only one or a small
number of the disputants involved in a conflict without operating in a
partial manner. 3 5 If the UN chose to pursue this course of action, it
would need to be clear that the party was being rewarded because it
had taken an action that advanced the settlement process. Impartiality
concerns may explain the premium Kriesberg has placed on ensuring
that messages about the desirability of rewards are communicated be-
fore they are actually utilized. 36
In theory, the case for UN impartiality seems unassailable. How-
ever, some observers of the conflict-resolution process have questioned
whether such a posture is a precondition for, or even consistent with,
effective mediation and the successful employment of positive sanctions.
For example, I. William Zartman and Touval have argued:
Impartiality is not necessary for successful mediation. This is borne
out by the success of mediators perceived to have been close to or allied
with one of the parties. Witness American mediation in the Arab-
Israeli conflict, Anglo-American mediation between Italy and Yugosla-
via on the Trieste issue, Soviet mediation between India and Pakistan
at Tashkent, and Algerian mediation between Iran and the United
States. 137
132. RATNER, supra note 8, at 52.
133. Tom Farer, Intervention in Unnatural Humanitarian Emergencies: Lessons of the
First Phase, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 3-4 (1996) ("UN officials generally construe impartiality
to require that they refrain from two things: One is publicly judging or even implying any
judgment concerning the merits of a dispute or conflict; the other is acting in any way
which affects the balance of power among contending groups.").
134. RATNER, supra note 8, at 52.
135. The parties to a conflict are likely to jump at every chance to take the UN to task
for its alleged partiality. If the UN is attacked from various quarters, the overall impar-
tiality of the UN will be underscored. Referring to Cambodian views of UNTAC, Janet
Heninger has remarked that:
[s]ome thought that the mission leaders were biased in favor of the State of
Cambodia, while others thought that UNTAC was insufficiently tough with
the Khmer Rouge. If all parties believe the United Nations is biased in favor
of their opponents, that may be an indicator of a balanced approach.
JANET E. HENINGER, PEACE-KEEPING IN TRANSITION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN CAMBODIA
137 (1994).
136. Kriesberg, supra note 95, at 420.
137. Saadia Touval & I. William Zartman, Introduction: Mediation in Theory, in
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 7, 15 (Saadia Touval & I. William
Zartman eds., 1985).
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It is unclear whether positive sanctions will accomplish more if
they are employed by a fellow disputant or a mediator. Lawson's work
on the use of rewards, for example, deals with influence attempts by ac-
tors that fall into both categories. Kriesberg distinguishes between re-
wards given by mediators and those conveyed by parties to a dispute.
According to him, "particularly in the Israeli-Arab continuing conflict,
intermediaries have initiated de-escalating efforts. UN representatives,
U.S. officials, journalists, and others have made or transmitted propos-
als from one of the adversary parties. These usually did not include any
coercive or conciliatory actions, and they did not result in de-escalating
negotiations."13 8 Meanwhile, Zartman and Touval have contended:
[US Secretary of State Henry] Kissinger offered economic aid to the
white Rhodesian settlers. [US President Ronald] Reagan offered eco-
nomic aid to an Angola free of Cubans, and the OAS and IDB have told
conflicting [Latin] American states that no development funds would
be available until their conflict was settled.139
They also state:
Through the diplomatic intervention of mediation, the mediator trans-
forms the bargaining structure from a dyad into a triangle.... [1]f the
mediator is to mediate-that is, intervene to diminish or resolve the
conflict-it must use the triangular structure to move the parties to
agreement rather than creating a victory for one side. Paradoxically,
this may mean temporarily reinforcing one side to keep it in the con-
flict, maintain the stalemate, and preserve the triangular relation-
ship.140
Thus, positive sanctions might enhance the mediation and conflict-
resolution efforts that third parties undertake, especially if maintaining
the triangular relationship identified by Zartman and Touval facilitates
dispute-settlement initiatives. Rewards may act as an effective vehicle
to keep disputants, who would otherwise drop out, engaged in the peace
process.141
The UN has sought to operate in a transparent manner. 42 Thus,
138. Kriesberg, supra note 95, at 411.
139. I. William Zartman & Saadia Touval, Conclusion: Mediation in Theory and Prac-
tice, in INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 251, 264 (Saadia Touval &
I. William Zartman eds., 1985).
140. Touval & Zartman, supra note 137, at 10-11.
141. In an age where the UN is increasingly called upon to undertake peace enforce-
ment operations, its involvement in disputes will not always be as a third party. Rather,
as were the cases in Somalia and Iraq, it may become involved in a direct armed confron-
tation with another actor. This posture would seem to complicate the work of the UN.
One advantage of the UN's becoming directly involved in a dispute as a party to it may be
that it might make more effective use of positive sanctions than if it had continued to
function as a third party mediator.
142. Transparency denotes the extent to which the operation of public institutions is
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covert reward-based strategies might be difficult to justify. However,
demand for such measures might be minimal. After all, most dispu-
tants are likely to desire basking in the legitimacy and favorable pub-
licity that the UN rewards are likely to confer upon them. In some set-
tings, personalities might wish to downplay the fact that they are the
beneficiaries of positive sanctions. 143 For example, if evidence of coop-
eration between the UN and the disputant surfaced, it might be charac-
terized as the puppet of foreign influences.44
3. Operational Objectives
Positive sanctions may be configured to achieve important opera-
tional outcomes. Just as important as how the UN goes about its work
is the results that its efforts achieve. For example, a UN-endorsed set-
tlement codifying blatant international aggression or serious violations
of international humanitarian law would likely be rejected outright. 145
Similarly, UN rewards should be compatible with its larger mission. At
a minimum, inducement strategies might vindicate international legal
principles and safeguard the long-term welfare of the population in the
conflict area. 146 Baldwin has addressed the importance of this latter
open to outside scrutiny. See, e.g., UN: Secretary-General Calls Education One of Most
Effective Forms of Defence Spending, M2 Presswire, Dec. 18, 1997, available in 1997 WL
16296321 ("United Nations legal officers are helping nations erect sound and transparent
legal frameworks, and fair and reliable judicial systems.").
143. For example, by functioning as the recipient of NATO support, BilIjana Plavsic
has risked losing her credibility with indigenous constituencies. See Howard Feinstein,
Shellshock in Sarajevo, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 7, 1997, at T004 ("Now she [Plavsic] has
become the West's puppet in the effort to eradicate Radovan Karadzic's power base in the
town of Pale.").
144. Interestingly, Ali Mahidi did not attempt to try to hide the fact that he main-
tained friendly relations with outsiders. His opponents, meanwhile, made much of this
interaction, using it to depict "Ali Mahdi [as] a stooge of foreign interests-in this case
Italian and Egyptian-bent on reestablishing dominance over Somalia. Ali Mahdi denies
he gets any such foreign backing, although he says he enjoys good relations with Italy, the
former colonial power." Keith B. Richburg, It Makes A Warlord Smile Somali Watches
U.N. Batter His Rival, WASH. POST, June 24, 1993, at A32.
145. As I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval have noted:
[an interest in specific outcomes occurs quite often in mediation sponsored
by international organizations. The [International Committee for the Red
Cross] ICRC, [the Organization of African Unity] OAU, and OAS all seek
specific solutions to disputes, not just agreements. They try to promote solu-
tions that can be interpreted as compatible with the standards of the Geneva
Conventions and of their charters, respectively, and that protect their image
as a guardian of these standards.
Zartman & Touval, supra note 139, at 257.
146. Given this, a proposal to reward a disputant for its cooperation by providing it
with arms would be summarily rejected unless such transfers were needed to stabilize a
skewed balance of power. The propriety of other packages of positive sanctions might be
less clear-cut. This is an area where NGOs, particularly those operating in the fields of
human rights and humanitarian assistance, might be able to offer the UN guidance on
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concern, arguing:
It seems unwise to assume that B [the actor to be influenced] always
knows what is best for him. It is not necessarily harmful to restrict the
choices available to children, drug addicts, or nation-states. Children
can be rewarded with too much candy; drug addicts can be rewarded
with too much heroin; and countries can be given more foreign aid than
is good for them.' 47
Some disputants, especially those born and bred on the battlefield,
might be particularly apt to lack an appreciation of the rewards likely
to contribute to their country's sustainable development.
Rewards might act as a vehicle to increase the amount of coopera-
tion and interaction between the disputant and the UN. As Baldwin
has noted, "[a]n important side effect [of an influence attempt utilizing
positive sanctions] is the 'spill over effect' on B's relations with A with
respect to other issues. While positive sanctions tend to enhance B's
willingness to cooperate with A on other issues, negative sanctions tend
to impede such competition."'148 Thus, positive sanctions rewarding a
party for its demobilization efforts might lead to greater cooperation in
the area of electoral activities. Similarly, increased interaction result-
ing from the use of rewards could serve as the basis for future collabo-
ration between the UN and the disputant. This result, it can be argued,
would be especially likely if the party that had been rewarded was inte-
grated into the governing authority of the post-conflict order. Thus, the
support and assistance that the African National Congress (ANC) re-
ceived from the UN while both crusaded against apartheid may func-
tion as one reason why the current ANC South African government has
undertaken active efforts to help bring conflicts in Southern Africa to
an end.149
The UN will also be interested in restoring the long-term economic
health of areas plagued by conflict. If it is not, disputes may ensue. 50
Positive sanctions might make a vital contribution to the economic re-
construction process. Moreover, given the role that private sector enti-
ties like multinational enterprises now play in the economic develop-
ment processes of a variety of countries, it may be wise for the UN to
integrate these actors into its attempts to use rewards as an induce-
what measures would be appropriate and which would not pass muster.
147. Baldwin, supra note 33, at 184.
148. Baldwin, supra note 45, at 32-33.
149. More pragmatic concerns such as regional stability may also account for South
Africa's activism in this area.
150. See Gregory Jowdy, Note, Truth Commissions in El Salvador and Guatemala: A
Proposal for Truth in Guatemala, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 285, 292 (1997) ("Much of
the Salvadoran civil conflict springs from this division between a landed elite and an im-
poverished peasantry.").
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ment strategy.
4. Scrutiny of the UN's Use of Positive Sanctions
Little monitoring of the UN's use of rewards is likely to occur.
Compared with a jurisdiction like the US, whose courts play a vigorous
role in appraising the legality of official conduct, judicial mechanisms
occupy a relatively peripheral place in the UN's constitutional ar-
rangements. 15 ' This marginalization imposes special responsibilities on
UN bodies and personnel to ensure that its conflict-resolution strategies
are compatible with UN principles. Besides this self-policing, NGOs
will probably assume a watchdog role, taking the UN to task for prob-
lematic policies.
15 2
E. Using Only Rewards or Employing a Multifaceted Strategy
To suppress conflicts, the UN might rely on strategies that utilize
rewards exclusively. Or, more multifaceted approaches, which combine
punishments with positive sanctions, could be employed. Of course, for
the foreseeable future, it may be difficult for the UN to preside over and
effectively use negative inducements like economic sanctions. Even if
this organization does enhance its capacity to utilize positive induce-
ment strategies, the UN would do well to prevent its limited prowess
with negative sanctions from atrophying. Indeed, as Kriesberg has con-
cluded, "[n]egotiations dependent solely on coercive or noncoercive in-
ducements provided by intermediaries or by parties not directly in-
volved in the conflict have not usually culminated in agreements."'' 5 3
If the UN successfully managed to harness the power of both pun-
ishments and rewards, its pronounced compartmentalization, which is
widely thought to thwart its ability to deal with situations in a coordi-
nated manner, might actually function as an advantage. 5 4 As Ratner
has noted:
[I]f one party undertakes outrageous or illegal actions, the political or-
gans can adopt a strong, condemnatory position and signal to the par-
ties the firmness of the international community's view. Far from the
corridors of power in New York, the Special Representative could dis-
tance himself [sic] a bit and assume the role of mediator in a way that
151. The International Court of Justice has attempted to scrutinize the legality of ac-
tions taken by the Security Council, See W. Michael Reisman Note, The Constitutional
Crisis in the United Nations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 83 (1993).
152. Cf. Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975) (questioning the assumption made by some officials
"that their job is to make policy without regard to questions of constitutionality which rest
within the exclusive domain of the courts").
153. Kriesberg, supra note 95, at 418.
154. See supra text accompanying note 93.
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furthers the settlement process. 155
The number of agencies in the UN means that there would be a
relatively large pool of candidates to engage in this "good cop, bad cop"
routine.156 For example, one component of a peace operation might take
a fairly hard-line stance in relation to a disputant while another would
promise to reward the party for greater compliance.
To be effective, this approach might require a great deal of orches-
tration. However, it would allow the UN to manage conflicts in a way
that states cannot. Governments, after all, place a premium on speak-
ing with one voice in the area of foreign affairs.157 To avoid the appear-
ance of inconsistency, they are not likely to modify or refine their
stances on specific issues often.15 8 The UN, meanwhile, may have fewer
qualms about shifting its position on particular matters.
Under a variation of this approach to conflict-resolution, the UN
might take responsibility for rewarding the parties when they cooper-
ate. If their commitment to peace wavered, states bordering the conflict
area might threaten the disputants. This course of action was pursued
in Mozambique. The UN directly disbursed rewards to the government
and RENAMO, including reconstruction and electoral assistance.
Meanwhile, when the settlement process seemed to be breaking down,
leading regional figures intervened to persuade these parties to settle
155. RATNER, supra note 8, at 80.
156. Id. at 80.
157. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83
VA. L. REV. 1617, 1621 (1997) ("In foreign affairs, the nation must speak with one voice,
not fifty.").
158. In states where power over the conduct of foreign affairs is distributed among
several branches, the achievement of an approach utilizing both positive and negative
sanctions simultaneously is possible. In a study of US human rights policy toward Indo-
nesia during the 1970s, Timo Antero Kivimaki has remarked:
[plublicly, the [US] Embassy [in Jakarta] alleged that it did not want sanc-
tions against friends and allies (such as Indonesia), but that political pres-
sures from the Congress were forcing its hand. Pressure from the Congress
and US public opinion could be used by [US Ambassador to Indonesia David]
Newson as leverage in human rights bargaining. Some US Embassy officials
have said that US officials in Indonesia had secretly encouraged US con-
gressmen to investigate human rights policies in Indonesia in order to gain
bargaining leverage at the administrative level.
Timo Antero Kivimaki, National Diplomacy for Human Rights: A Study of US Exercise of
Power in Indonesia, 1974-1979, 16 HUM. RTS. Q., 415 (1994).
In situations in which the executive branch has taken the lead in dealing with a foreign
affairs issue, it will be more difficult for it to adopt an approach utilizing both rewards
and punishments. The Economist, for example, has criticized the "Clinton administra-
tion's own careless policies towards Haiti-shifting ground under pressure, whether it be
from thugs at the harbour in Port-au-Prince, from public opinion, from the congressional
black caucus, from Florida voters, or whatever-that put credibility on the line in Haiti in
the first place." Nightmare, supra note 110, at 19.
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their differences peacefully. 159 Obviously, the viability of this approach
will depend on the existence of individuals in the region who command
the requisite moral authority and possess the means to make good on
their threats. 160
F. Combining UN Rewards with Ones Offered by the Disputants
Themselves
Besides providing positive sanctions to cooperative disputants, the
UN might attempt to persuade the parties to a conflict to reward each
other. Kriesberg has asserted that "[i]ntermediaries can often provide
compensatory benefits to both adversaries, which, in turn, induces them
to make additional concessions to each other: witness the Camp David
negotiations with the Israeli and Egyptian governments." 161 Of course,
if the parties are emerging from a long conflict that has exhausted their
resources, they may lack the capacity to channel material rewards to
their adversaries. Some unilateral measures, however, are inexpensive
to finance. These include truce declarations, 162 troop withdrawals, de-
mobilization initiatives, and the establishment of truth commissions. It
can be argued that the structure of the Mozambican peace agreement
fostered cooperation between the governing Front for the Liberation of
Mozambique and RENAMO. Protocol III of the Rome Accords 163 stipu-
lated that RENAMO request funds to finance its electoral activities
from the Mozambican government, which would either provide the
needed resources or seek them from overseas sources. 164
Besides agreeing to pay for an advesary's return to civilian life, one
159. As The Economist reported:
In October Mozambique was due to hold its first free election. Led by...
[South African President Nelson] Mandela and [Zimbabwean President] ...
[Robert] Mugabe, other countries of the region warned its rival parties to ac-
cept the result and said that if need be they would send in a force to help
keep order. Then, only hours before the poll, Afonso Dhlakama, the former
rebel leader, said his Renamo movement would pull out. Both Mr. Mugabe
and South Africa's first deputy president, Thabo Mbeki, promptly got on the
telephone to persuade him to change his mind. Mr. Dhlakama complied,
Renamo took part in the election, and says its leader, accepts its defeat.
Neighborhood Watch in Southern Africa, ECONOMIST, Dec. 3, 1994, at 51.
160. In Mozambique, both of these conditions were present. South African President
Nelson Mandela enjoys almost universal respect. His country, moreover, is able to project
military might with relative ease.
161. Kriesberg, supra note 95, at 419.
162. More than a month before the signing of the Act of New York, the document that
ended El Salvador's civil war, in December 1991, the FMLN announced that it was sus-
pending its military activities. See Salvadoran Army to Continue Operations Despite Rebel
Truce, Agence France-Presse, Nov. 19, 1991, available in 1991 WL 3231671 ("The Salva-
doran military Monday refused to match a unilateral rebel cease-fire in effect since last
week and accused the insurgents of breaking their own truce.").
163. General Peace Agreement, supra note 78, at 111.
164. Id. The interaction between RENAMO and FRELIMO that this scheme might en-
gender may have functioned as the basis for greater cooperation between the parties.
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disputant can offer its counterparts particular positions or administra-
tive competencies in the post-conflict authority. If these are accepted, a
government of national unity (GNU) would exist. Managers of the
transition to democratic rule in South Africa used this approach suc-
cessfully. It also is said to have materially advanced at least one peace
offensive pursued in Angola. 165 In both contexts, the party that seemed
likely to win the upcoming electoral process or had, in fact, triumphed
at the polls, offered its rivals posts in specific ministries and/or ambas-
sadorships. 166 Although offers to establish a GNU have the advantage
of setting a precedent for direct cooperation between groups that have
been bitter enemies in a previous incarnation, these alliances may also
represent an extremely effective way for the dominant party to margi-
nalize political opposition in the emergent regime. Because they are a
part of the government, junior partners may experience difficulty credi-
bly criticizing official policy decisions. 167 Thus, given the key role that
vigorous political opposition plays in the functioning of many successful
democracies, GNUs may be problematic in the long run.
165. The international community pressured FRELIMO, which anticipated winning
the 1994 elections in Mozambique and did, but by a smaller-than-expected margin, to
bring RENAMO into some sort of power-sharing arrangement. Lamb, for example, has
reported:
Facing the political wilderness, Dhlakama wrested what concessions he
could. While publicly issuing a statement drafted by the British embassy
that the international community would investigate his allegations of fraud,
he also secured agreement from negotiators to pressure Chissano to give
Renamo members places in the new government and at least one provincial
governorship.
Lamb, supra note 112, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, English Non-US File. The
Economist indicated that "[t]he Americans, Portuguese (Mozambique's former colonisers)
and the United Nations would like to see the two sides strike a pre-election deal to share
power, as a way of giving the defeated party a stake in future stability. To this end, they
want Mr. Mandela's help." Good Neighbor: South Africa, ECONOMIST, Aug. 13, 1994, at
40. In the end, however, a GNU was not set up and no RENAMO provincial governors
were appointed.
166. After the 1994 elections, F.W. de Klerk, whose Nationalist Party finished second
to the African National Congress (ANC), became the country's second deputy president.
Chief Mangoosuthu Buthelezi, the head of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), which fin-
ished a distant third, took over control of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Similarly, in An-
gola, "[flollowing the recommendations of intermediaries and trying to allay UNITA's
grievances, the MPLA-led government agreed on [the] creation of a government of na-
tional unity, offering UNITA four ministerial portfolios, seven vice-ministerial posts, as
well as three provincial governor and seven vice-governor posts." Leonid L. Fituni, The
Collapse of the Socialist State: Angola and the Soviet Union, in COLLAPSED STATES: THE
DISINTEGRATION AND RESTORATION OF LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY 143, 150 (I. William
Zartman ed., 1995).
167. Before leaving the South African GNU, the Nationalist Party encountered prob-
lems challenging public policies. See A Blacker Future for the Nats?, ECONOMIST, Jan. 27,
1996, at 40.
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G. The Disputants'Access to Alternative Donors and Sources of
Funding
The UN may experience difficulty with reward-based strategies if
the disputant to be influenced can go elsewhere to meet its resource
needs. In his article on various attempts to use positive sanctions by
Middle Eastern states during the 1970s, Lawson asserted:
[O]n the whole, offers of rewards that were made under conditions of
increasing bipolarity succeeded in limiting if not terminating these con-
flicts. This result arose from the first place from a convergence be-
tween the dependence of relations associated with positive sanctions
and the pattern of dominance and subordination that characterize rela-
tions among countries in a bipolar order. It was also a consequence of
the inability of potential recipients in this situation to manipulate the
offers of positive sanctions by using them as bargaining chips to play
rival powers off against one another. 168
Presumably, influence attempts utilizing positive inducements
would be an even more effective vehicle to mold the actions of dispu-
tants if made in a unipolar environment. After all, there is no possibil-
ity that the party to be influenced will play the donor off of a rival since
the donor, by definition, lacks one. Thus, the success of UN efforts
making use of rewards will be partially determined by the number of
outside actors that have an interest in the conflict to be resolved. Due
to the relatively large number of external players that queued up to
play supporting roles in the settlement of the conflicts in Cambodia and
the former Yugoslavia, efforts using positive inducements may not be as
successful in these situations than in a post-Cold War backwater like
Rwanda.
Disputants that can rely on the assistance of a wealthy patron may
feel relatively inclined to reject UN initiatives to use rewards to gain
leverage over them. Therefore, the UN ought to stress the importance
of states using established channels for disbursing reconstruction and
development assistance to the factions involved in a given settlement
process. For example, in Cambodia, aid pledged by various states at the
1992 Ministerial Conference on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of
Cambodia was earmarked for projects approved by the SNC (Supreme
National Council)/UNTAC Technical Advisory Committee. In practice,
countries sometimes executed end-runs around this body. As Janet E.
Heninger has argued:
168. Fred H. Lawson, Positive Sanctions and the Managing of International Conflict:
Five Middle Eastern Cases, 11 INT'L J. 628, 650 (1985).
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The Thai government rebuilt roads in the border area to facilitate its
own logging interests. Other projects that were not submitted included
the rehabilitation of roads, schools, and health facilities in the [Na-
tional United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Coop-
erative Cambodia] FUNCINPEC zone by the United States. This effort
was the continuation of an aid program designed to bolster the non-
Communist resistance. Similarly, the Japanese government undertook
reconstruction of the bridge of Chrui Changvar as a gesture of goodwill
to the Hun Sen administration. 169
UN leverage over a disputant may be further enhanced by re-
stricting the disputant's ability to sell resources on world markets. For
example, even after Soviet support of the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola government and South African and US aid to the
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola dried up, these
parties used Angolan diamonds and oil to continue military operations
in this country.170 Thus, the successful use of positive sanctions may
need to rest on the use of negative inducements. In Angola, the UN ap-
plied economic sanctions to those areas under UNITA control. Simi-
larly, in Cambodia, the Security Council, in 1992, halted exports of tim-
ber from this country. The justification invoked for this latter action
was "to protect Cambodia's natural resources."'171 However, perhaps the
real logic driving it was to induce the Khmer Rouge to comply with the
Paris Accords by increasing its dependence on funds disbursed through
UN channels.
H. The Timing of Inducement Efforts
Positive sanctions may be more effectively employed during specific
stages of a conflict's lifespan than others. 172
1. Before the Conflict
It may be crucial to deploy rewards before conflicts turn violent.
Indeed, the importance of taking measures early on in the development
of a conflict has been emphasized by Steven John Stedman. According
to him:
169. HENINGER, supra note 135, at 59.
170. See Paul Taylor, With Mischievous Outsiders Gone, Angola Creates Its Own Suf-
fering, WASH. POST, July 28, 1994, at A20 ("The government draws revenue from offshore
oil wells that produce 550,000 barrels a day, according to official Angolan estimates.
UNITA draws at least $100 million a year - perhaps much more - from diamonds it ex-
tracts from mines in northeastern Angola ......
171. Id. at 62.
172. Of course, it may be difficult to separate a given conflict from other periods in his-
tory that have seen strife between the same parties. Kriesberg, for example, notes "it is
not possible to isolate instances with clearly marked beginnings and ends." Kriesberg,
supra note 95, at 407.
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[C]onflict emerges from tangible interests, but as soon as the conflict
turns overtly violent, concerns about security and survival coexist with
the issues that caused the conflict. Resolution of conflict necessarily
becomes more difficult, since problem solving must work on two dis-
tinct levels: the issues that prompted the conflict in the first place, and
the ending of the violent expression of the conflict. 173
Thus, rewards may prove particularly potent during the prelude to
a conflict. In addition to mediating between the potential combatants,
the UN might intervene and offer rewards to discourage those who are
believed to be fueling the dispute. This strategy may prove successful
because many internal conflicts run through a stage marked by the
"formation of a single movement led by charismatic organizers who seek
to unite disparate groups and force the attention of the government
to... [its] grievances."'174 Or, action could be taken to eliminate the
roots of the conflict, especially if they are predominantly economic or so-
cial.
The problems with offering positive sanctions during the early
stages of conflicts should be obvious. First, at any given time, there are
a multitude of situations where stresses between groups and interests
seem to be present. 175 Even the best intelligence will be unable to de-
liver reliable predictions regarding the ones likely to explode into actual
hostilities. 176 For example, according to David Gompert, "[tihe $4 bil-
173. Stephen J. Stedman, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa, in CONFLICT
RESOLUTION IN AFRICA 367, 388 (Francis M. Deng & I. William Zartman eds., 1991).
Similarly, L. Ronald Scheman and John W. Ford have remarked that "[ilnternational eco-
nomic leverage is most influential in the early stages of potential disputes." Scheman,
supra note 92, at 199. At the same time, they proffer little empirical data to back up this
assertion.
174. I. William Zartman, Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Con-
flicts, in ELUSIVE PEACE: NEGOTIATING AN END TO CIVIL WARS 3, 13 (1. William Zartman
ed., 1995).
175. Ernie Regehr has argued:
The capacity of the UN to intervene is immensely complicated by the fact
that the descent into this type of war is usually slow and gradual. Civil wars
are not declared; they are inadvertently drifted into. There is typically no
clear moment of crisis and thus no consensus on when and how the interna-
tional community should intervene.
Ernie Regehr, Warfare's New Face, WORLD PRESS REV., Apr. 1994, at 14.
176. There are some contexts, like smoldering tensions existing at the margins of con-
flicts already involving actual fighting, which seem particularly apt to degenerate into
armed strife. A desire to thwart the spread of fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina to Macedo-
nia explains the UN's decision to insert a peace-keeping operation, originally carried out
under the auspices of UNPROFOR, there. At the same time, more could have been done
to defuse hostility in Macedonia. For example, the UN could have followed the lead of the
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, which "organized a series of meetings be-
tween Greek and Turkish Cypriot community leaders out of which... a process of recon-
ciliation might develop." FETHERSTON, supra note 56, at 53.
In situations where a conflict has already broken out and threatens to spread to a
neighboring region, the disputants themselves may have a stake in ensuring that the
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lion aid carrot the EC ... produced [in 1991] could have been the last
hope for avoiding war, had it not been dangled in front of the Yugoslavs
at least a year too late."'177 The UN has become more adept at collecting
and processing information. However, its intelligence-gathering capa-
bilities still lag behind those of many governments. States routinely
fail to foresee even massive transformations in the international sys-
tem.178 For example, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) devoted
a massive amount of resources to tracking events in the former Soviet
Union and its sphere of influence. However, the collapse of authoritar-
ian socialism in Eastern Europe caught the CIA off guard.
Second, the disputants to be influenced might hold entirely genu-
ine, although exaggerated, expectations of what they can accomplish by
taking up arms against an adversary. The political platform of Russian
ultranationalist leader Vladimir Zhironovsky, who promised to reincor-
porate Alaska into a resurgent Russian Empire under his leadership,
embodies this tendency. 179 It was also operative during the period be-
fore the fighting in the Balkans. Politicians of various ethnic back-
grounds in this region staked claims on a greater Serbia or Croatia,
which invariably encompassed all or most of the former Yugoslavia's
territory. 8 0 Given what these parties and other disputants around the
strife remains contained. As The Economist has reported:
But while the Russians have been wielding a big stick, they have also been
dangling, at least in Ingushetia [a region bordering Chechnya] a carrot.
Since 1994, they have pumped in money: Ingushetia enjoys a special 'off-
shore' tax status within the Russian federation, bringing in $loom a year-
hence the new hotel and artificial lake. Now it is to become an international
tax haven, a would-be Russian Jersey.
Jersey in the Caucuses?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 23, 1996, at 48.
177. Gompert, supra note 36, at 35.
178. As Kenneth Allard has noted:
It has taken the United Nations several years of ever more intense involve-
ment in complicated operations before it has quietly admitted something
that military people have always known: intelligence is the key to any opera-
tion, including those designed to secure the peace. While 'information' is the
term of choice, operations in Somalia proved that, whatever it is called, in-
telligence has a crucial role to play at the lower end of the conflict spectrum
as well as in other places.
KENNETH ALLARD, SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED 74 (1995).
179. See, e.g., All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast, Dec. 13, 1993) (reporting
Zhironovsky's desire "to reclaim American Alaska for Russia.").
180. Ed Vulliamy has noted that during the period leading up to the outbreak of hos-
tilities in the Balkans:
[N]owhere were the maps so ubiquitous as in former Yugoslavia, and no-
where were their frontiers so charged with historical emotion.... [Serb]
maps show a 'future Yugoslavia' in which Serbia encompasses all of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and all southern Croatia, leaving behind a rump around Zagreb
and Osijek and what looks like a vassal Dalmatia .... [while their Croatian
counterparts] show a Croatia that envelopes all of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
which ceases to exist.
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world have hoped to gain through violence, few rewards were likely to
placate them.18' Meanwhile, the years of devastating fighting in the
Balkans have seen the combatants scale back their demands by modi-
fying negotiating positions, withdrawing from the fray, or teaming up
with a former adversary. 8 2
Third, heavy pre-hostilities reliance on rewards before conflicts in-
volve armed strife may create perverse incentives for other disputants.
A party that would not have otherwise resorted to violent conflict might
make noises about heading in that direction to collect inducements. As
Baldwin has argued, "[i]t is sometimes suggested, perhaps in jest, that
poor nations have an incentive to create or maintain an internal Com-
munist threat in order to qualify for foreign aid from the United
States."'1 3 If the UN made serious attempts to use positive induce-
ments to prevent the outbreak of conflicts, it might be viewed as a font
of free sustenance by unscrupulous players in the international political
arena.184
2. At the Outset of Hostilities
The viability of using positive sanctions would seem to bottom out
after a conflict has begun, but before it is amenable to settlement. In
actuality, it may be critical for mediators, especially the UN, to rely
heavily on rewards for an eventual resolution to the conflict. As David
A. Lax and James K. Sebenius have argued:
If 'not ripe' [for settlement] is the diagnosis,... getting people in a
room together and employing all sorts of careful procedural means to
foster negotiation will be to no avail. The basic conditions for a negoti-
ED VULLIAMY, SEASONS IN HELL: UNDERSTANDING BOSNIA'S WAR 8-10 (1994).
181. As Stedman has written:
Individuals such as Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid, Serbian Presi-
dent Slobodan Milosevic, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, and Ango.
lan rebel leader Jonas Savimbi and genocidal factions such as the presiden-
tial guard in Rwanda decided on civil war because they thought they could
prevail militarily and that the international community was powerless to
stop them.
Stephen J. Stedman, Alchemy for a New World Order: Overselling 'Preventative Diplo-
macy', FOREIGN AFF., May-June 1995, at 14, 18.
182. For example, efforts have been made to forge an alliance between Bosnian Croats
and Bosnian Muslims.
183. Baldwin, supra note 45, at 36.
184. It might be more effective to use negative inducements at the outset of conflicts.
For example, David Gompert has highlighted the role that a peace enforcement force in
Bosnia-Herzegovina during early 1992 could have played "to discourage violence before it
began." Gompert, supra note 36, at 37. Similarly, "General Romeo Dallaire, the brave
Canadian on the spot [in Rwanda], says that, given a few motivated soldiers, he might
have fended off many of the massacres." The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (book
review), ECONOMIST, Nov. 11, 1995, at Sl.
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ated agreement will not be met since possible agreements appear infe-
rior to at least one side in comparison with its unilateral alternatives.
When this is the case, strategy should focus not on the negotiation pro-
cess but instead on actions away from the table that can reshape per-
ceptions in a manner that generates a zone of possible agreement.1
8 5
Richard Haass has exhorted actors attempting to resolve disputes
to spur this process along by trying "to get governments and their con-
stituents to recognize the costs of disagreement and the potential bene-
fits of agreement, as well as to expect compromises." 18 6 According to
Haass, mediators can alter the perspectives of disputants by offering
them military assistance, intelligence support, security guarantees, and
the commitment of an alliance. 8 7 Of course, the UN is not in a position
to provide such services. However, UN decisionmakers could make lim-
ited economic commitments to the parties.188
3. When Conflicts "Ripen"
Using rewards when conflicts ripen could be counterproductive.
According to Zartman, a conflict has reached this point when it:
is associated with two different sorts of intensity-called here plateaus
and the precipice-which produce different sorts of pressure-called re-
spectively deadlocks and deadlines. A plateau and its deadlock begin
when one side is unable to achieve its aims, to resolve the problem, or
to win the conflict by itself, and they are completed when the other side
arrives at a similar perception. Each party must begin to feel uncom-
fortable in the costly dead-end into which it has gotten itself. A pla-
teau must be perceived by both not as a momentary resting ground, but
as a hurting stalemate, a flat, unpleasant terrain stretching into the
future, providing no later possibilities for decisive escalation or for
graceful escape. 189
However, it is sometimes unclear when a conflict has ripened. Ac-
cording to Kriesberg:
Whether circumstances are ripe for an agreement is unequivocally
clear only in extreme cases. Only sometimes is there no chance for an
agreement or the pressure to reach a settlement so strong it is difficult
to imagine failure, as when reaching a disengagement agreement be-
tween Egyptian and Israeli forces in 1973 was unequivocally neces-
185. DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING
FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 59 (1986).
186. HAASS, supra note 23, at 146.
187. Id. at 147.
188. Id. at 146.
189. I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, RIPE FOR RESOLUTION: CONFLICT AND INTERVENTION IN
AFRICA 268 (1989) (emphasis added).
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sary.19o
Haass, meanwhile, has asserted that "it is important to keep in
mind that ripeness is dynamic; it can emerge as easily as it can disap-
pear. What may have been a ripe moment in Lebanon in 1982 soon
passed."19 1 Thus, it may be difficult to implement a positive induce-
ment policy when conflicts reach the ripeness point. Even if an ob-
server or mediator is able to ascertain that a given dispute has ripened,
it may be counterproductive to employ them at this stage of the conflict-
resolution process. Rewards given at this juncture may dull the pain
that has caused disputants to become more receptive to settlement.
Any flexibility that the party derives as a result of possessing rewards
may encourage it to be less accommodating in the positions it stakes out
at the negotiating table. 192 If rewards must be used, they might be ex-
plicitly linked to the disputant's accession to the agreement or to the
achievement of progress on issues that continue to divide the parties.
Such areas of disagreement are likely to exist. As Haass has asserted:
Ripeness is not either totally present or totally absent. Often only
parts of a problem are ripe for negotiation; it would be an error in most
cases not to address part of a problem in an attempt to solve the entire
problem. There is some risk in this-the easier unsolved parts of the
problem can in principle lubricate the more difficult ones-but this
danger tends to be outweighed by the need to reduce tensions and in
the process demonstrate that progress is possible. 193
4. After the Storm
The importance of formulating strategies to keep disputants en-
gaged in settlement processes should not be underestimated. It may
take months or even several years for the UN to implement the provi-
sions of a comprehensive accord. 194 The UN's experience with the
Khmer Rouge suggests that even after a disputant consents to coopera-
tion, it may subsequently withdrawal its support. It is possible that
such situations will be avoided by rewarding the parties for their con-
190. KRIESBERG, supra note 46, at 146.
191. HAASS, supra note 23, at 145.
192. When parties take steps that advance the settlement process, their patrons may
feel intense pressure to respond with rewards. Such actions, though politically expedient,
may be hazardous to the long-term health of the settlement of the conflict-resolution proc-
ess.
193. HAASS, supra note 23, at 144.
194. Deployments did not always take so long to effect. Upon being told in 1960 "to
whisk a UN force to the Congo, Brian Urquhart, top peacekeeper at the time, was under
the impression that Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) was on the Indian Ocean, not the Atlan-
tic, side of Africa. Nevertheless, he got 3,000 men to the right place in three days."
Rwanda, supra note 184, at $11.
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tinued cooperation. However, positive inducements are unlikely to suc-
ceed in contexts where the disputant has signed off on an agreement,
but has no intention of abiding by it. As Stedman has noted:
[I]f the UN is to continue to work to implement negotiated settlements
of civil wars, it must start to think strategically about a generic prob-
lem in such settlements: namely, that some of the antagonists are not
sincere towards ending the conflict. The UN operations in the Western
Sahara, Cambodia and Angola were undermined by parties whose
commitment to negotiations was tactical. 195
I. Rewards and the Roots of Conflicts
Reward-based strategies may prove more effective in disputes with
specific causes. What underlies strife is a subject that has received in-
tense scrutiny. According to Zartman:
Internal conflicts are about many different things in different cases,
but all aggravated grievances can be subsumed under two related cate-
gories-neglect and discrimination, or a distributional element and an
identity element. Without distributional deprivation, identity remains
a positive factor and not a motivation for conflict; without an identity
element, distributional inequities remain unfocused and nonmobiliz-
ing. The mix of the two elements may vary, situating the conflict to-
ward one end of the spectrum or the other.196
At the identity end of this continuum lie primarily ethnic wars like
the ones unfolding in the Balkans, Rwanda, and Burundi although
these conflicts have economic explannations. 197 Meanwhile, the conflict
in El Salvador served as a reminder that extreme distributional inequi-
ties will sometimes spawn mass violence. 198
If positive sanctions are more likely to take the form of material
support and incentives, it can be argued that their utilization would be
more successful in the latter category of conflict. After all, gaining more
resources is likely to explain why the disputant took up arms in the
first place. Indeed, the reward itself may provide the sustenance or en-
195. Stephen J. Stedman, UN Intervention in Civil Wars: Imperatives of Choice and
Strategy, in BEYOND TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING 44, 55 (Donald C.F. Daniel & Bradd C.
Hayes eds., 1995).
196. ZARTMAN, supra note 174, at 5.
197. See Chaim Kaufmann, Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars, 20
INT'L SECURITY 136, 136 (1996) ("Ethnic civil wars are burning in Bosnia, Croatia,
Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Sudan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Chechnya, Tajikistan,
Kashmir, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka, and are threatening to break out in dozens of other
places throughout the world.").
198. See Marjorie Miller & Tracy Wilkinson, Despite Lingering Distrust, Salvador
Truce Holds Firm Central America, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1992, at 1 ('Land is one of the
most complicated and, historically, one of the most divisive issues in tiny El Salvador.").
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titlement the faction seeks. However, the UN could also construct posi-
tive sanctions to enhance a given community's sense of identity. These
might take the form of safe havens, UN-sponsored truth commissions,
and assurances that the threatened group will receive representation or
be guaranteed special rights and privileges in the post-conflict order.19 9
Other disputants would have to cooperate before some identity-
enhancing rewards could become operational. Of course, inducements
designed to satisfy the material needs of the disputant would not be
completely out of place in conflicts driven by discrimination or denials
of identity. In these environemnts, the disputants' post-conflict need for
material support may be as pronounced as the identity grievances that
originally prompted the fighting. 200
Although ethnic and economic conflicts are likely to spawn a great
deal of suffering and instability in particular regions, strife involving
combatants who fight for the sake of fighting has featured more promi-
nently in the post-Cold War universe. As Martin van Creveld has
noted:
[W]ar, far from being merely a means, has very often been considered
an end-a highly attractive activity for which no other can provide an
adequate substitute. The reason why other activities do not provide a
substitute is precisely because they are 'civilized;' in other words,
bound by artificial rules. 20 1
Unfortunately, it seems likely that this harrowing reason for be-
coming involved in civil strife will grow in relation to other motives for
taking up arms. Robert Kaplan has argued that "[a]s anybody who has
had experience with Chetniks in Serbia, 'technicals' in Somalia, Ton-
tons Macoutes in Haiti, or soldiers in Sierra Leone can tell you, in
places where the Western Enlightenment has not penetrated and where
there has always been mass poverty, people find liberation in vio-
lence."202 Should combatants with such an orientation function as the
main protagonists in a given conflict, the utility of positive sanctions
would be marginal. 20 3
199. Part of the agreement hammered out at Lancaster House between the various
factions in the then-Rhodesia guaranteed whites 20% of the seats in the new country's
legislative authority during a transitional period. See Agreements Concluded at Lancas-
ter House Conference, Dec. 21, 1979, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 387, 394-95 (1980).
200. See, e.g., Angry Demobilised Bosnian Soldiers on Hunger Strike, Dec. 5, 1996,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, available in 1996 WL 12194071 ("A group of 100 Bosnian
building workers, including many former soldiers, are staging a hunger strike in Sarajevo
over poor living conditions, a Bosnian radio station reported Thursday").
201. MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR 218 (1991).
202. Robert Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, ATLANTIC, Feb. 1994, at 44.
203. As The Economist has reported, "[plart of the potency of the Shining Path lies in
its indiscriminate use of violence. It will kill officials, leftists, rightists, trade unionists,
tourists, anyone; on August 19th, for instance, it slaughtered 60 Indians in Peru's Ama-
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J. Positive Sanctions and the Nature of the Conflict
The success of reward-based strategies may be determined by the
complexion of the dispute the UN is seeking to end. Assuming that dis-
putes can be reliably characterized as internal or international, 2 4 much
of the literature on positive incentives deals with influence attempts
made in the context of international disputes. As Zartman has as-
serted, resolving internal conflicts can often be more difficult than
ending international ones. According to him:
[T]he most striking characteristic of internal conflict is its asymmetry,
one party (government) is strong and the other (insurgent) is weak....
Negotiations under conditions of asymmetry (asymmetrical negotia-
tion) are a paradox, because one of the basic findings about the nego-
tiation process is that it functions best under conditions of equality,
and indeed only takes place when the parties have some form of mu-
tual veto over outcomes. 205
The international community is not likely to task the UN with the
resolution of such conflicts. Fearing that its sovereignty might be un-
dermined, the overwhelmingly dominant party to the dispute (the gov-
ernment) is likely to do everything in its power to keep the UN or any
international organization from becoming involved in the settlement of
the conflict.206 For example, the UN's failure in Somalia partially stems
zon jungle." The Other Obstacles to Change, ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 1993, at 125.
204. In its Tadic ruling, the ICTY attempted to determine whether the Bosnian con-
flict was internal or international. The Tribunal commented:
[I]n 1993, when the Statute [of the International Tribunal] was drafted, the
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia could have been characterized as both in-
ternal and international, or alternatively, as an internal conflict alongside an
international one, or as an international conflict that had subsequently been
replaced by one or more internal conflicts, or some combination thereof.
The Prosecutor v. Tadic (Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Juris-
diction), U.N. International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72,
reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 908 (1997).
205. ZARTMAN, supra note 174, at 7-8.
206. In this respect, the UN efforts to end the disputes in such countries as El Salva-
dor, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Angola may represent an aberration. The parties con-
trolling the state structure in each of these contexts were severely weakened as a result of
prolonged war; they were pressured into accepting a UN presence by their Cold War pa-
trons or influential regional power brokers. Haiti is also an exception to this general rule.
Not only was the military takeover condemned universally, but Haiti exists in the shadow
of a superpower, which was unwilling to live with the massive refugee flows that the re-
pression unleashed by the junta generated. The uniqueness of Haiti is hammered home
by the international community's reaction to the events in the Gambia and Niger. While
the democratic governments of both countries have been overthrown by military coups,
there has been no talk of injecting a UN presence into these countries to restore them.
See W. Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling Democracies, 18
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 794, 798 (1995) (criticizing the international community's failure to
respond to the 1994 coup in the Gambia and other military overthrows of civilian govern-
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from the meddling in that country by Sudan, which believed that if
UNOSOM II prevailed, the UN might attempt to resolve the long-
standing Sudanese civil war.207 Similarly, such countries as Indonesia,
China, Russia, Nigeria, and Colombia are likely to do everything in
their power to keep the resolution of the conflicts unfolding in these
states off of the UN's agenda.
Were governments to consent to international involvement in re-
solving conflicts within their borders, it is unclear how useful positive
sanctions would be in bringing an end to these disputes. The stark
asymmetries likely to exist in these environments may explain why it is
doubtful that using rewards will be successful. Insurgents might be dis-
posed to respond favorably to reward-based strategies. This posture
may advance, somewhat, the cause of peace. However, it seems less
likely that the UN could gain leverage over the government, which is
more likely to enjoy access to a wide variety of resources.
Where power imbalances are less extreme, the UN is more likely to
become involved. Zartman's generalization about the distorted balance
of capacities inherent in most internal conflicts may have applied to the
lion's share of disputes that unfolded during the Cold War.208 However,
it retains less pertinence now.20 9 What gives many internal conflicts
their asymmetry is the presence of a viable state structure. Those who
control it are able to mobilize resources easily.210 During the super-
power confrontation, the continued existence of the state during periods
of conflict was assumed. Assistance from the government's overseas al-
lies ensured that it continued to function. The side possessing it at any
stage of the conflict enjoyed considerable advantages over any force
challenging it. Of course, the state has come under unbelievable strains
ments).
207. Walter R. Meed, for example, has highlighted the role that Sudan played in the
strife in Somalia. According to him:
Somalia has a strategic location with the longest coastline on the Horn of Af-
rica. As chaos descended on that unhappy country, Iranian-oriented Muslim
fundamentalists--already in power in the Sudan nearby-looked likely to
gain control of all or part of a country that controls the sea-lanes through
which Middle Eastern oil flows to the United States, Europe and Japan.
Walter R. Mead, In Quagmire of Serbia, Path for U.S. Involvement, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27,
1992, Opinion, at 1.
208. See ZARTMAN, supra note 174, at 7-8.
209. Thus, many observers have characterized some internal conflicts as "wars of at-
trition." See Bosnia Counters Serb Offensive near Sarajevo, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 18,
1992, at 5 ('Although the fighting was intense, Gen. Hussein Ali Abdel Razek, the Egyp-
tian commander of UN forces in Bosnia, saw it as part of a 'war of attrition' in the capital
that neither side had much chance of winning.").
210. Cf. Martin Jacques, A New Morality Could Grow out of Corruption in High Places,
TIMES (London), Mar. 28, 1993, available in 1993 WL 10564999 ("The kind of influence
exercised by the governing parties over the public sector means they enjoy access to vast
resources. The temptation to abuse this influence for party or personal gain is hard to re-
sist.").
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in many parts of the world. 211 In those situations where a functioning
state apparatus is no longer part of the political equation, conflict has
become more fluid. For example, since the beginning of the fighting in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and during the round of strife in Angola between
1992 and 1995, the battle lines in both conflicts fluctuated dramati-
cally. 212 Similarly, at the beginning of 1997, Laurent Kabila existed at
the margins of politics in Zaire. Barely five months later, he controlled
this country.21 3 In fact, where anarchy reigns in the sense that power
has become increasingly decentralized, factions, it can be argued, inter-
act with each other in much the same way as do disputing countries.
Thus, generalizations about the use of positive sanctions, which are of-
ten the product of study about their use in international conflicts, would
seem to apply to civil strife plaguing areas in which the state has either
withered away or been intentionally destroyed.
K Rewards and Bystanders
As the UN generates reward-based strategies, it should be con-
cerned about who is on the receiving-end of these measures. Ex-
combatants and bystanders are both potential targets. Individuals in
possession of the disputant's destructive capacity are well-situated to
prolong conflict or re-ignite it. Thus, the case for channelling positive
sanctions to this cohort seems compelling. Adopting this policy, how-
211. Zartman has noted that "[i]n the world after the Cold War, not only has the bipo-
lar, interstate system of world order dissolved, but in many places the state itself has
collapsed." I. William Zartman, Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse, in
COLLAPSED STATES: THE DISINTEGRATION AND RESTORATION OF LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY
1, 1 (1. William Zartman ed., 1995). According to Ernie Regehr, "[u]rgent wars are prop-
erly understood as civil wars. They are primarily a consequence of failed states-states
that are unable to forge a minimum national consensus and to meet basic human needs.
Current wars are typically desperate attempts by states to halt the spread of internal
chaos." Regehr, supra note 175, at 14. Finally, Ibrahim A. Gambari has written that "the
incidence of state collapse in Africa appear to have increased in the period since the high
point of the Cold War, continuing into the aftermath of superpower confrontation. Af-
rica's growing marginalization in the post-Cold War period may, in fact, have accelerated
the process of state collapse." Ibrahim A. Gambari, The Role of Foreign Intervention in
African Reconstruction, in COLLAPSED STATES: THE DISINTEGRATION AND RESTORATION OF
LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY 221, 221 (1. William Zartman ed., 1995).
212. At one point in the round of fighting in Angola that began in 1992, UNITA con-
trolled as much as 70% of Angola although the MPLA was able to hold on to Luanda and
the oil-rich province of Cabinda. However, due largely to the military training and assis-
tance that Executive Outcomes, a South African firm made up largely of ex-SADF per-
sonnel, provided to the government forces, the MPLA was able to reverse these losses and
was closing in on rebel strongholds when the latest peace agreement was signed. See, e.g.,
Mercenaries Changing Face of For-profit Fighting, Agence France-Presse, Nov. 15, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 13434983 ('Executive Outcomes, based in South Africa, is active
throughout Africa including Angola.").
213. See James Rupert, In Rebel City, the Powers That Would Be, WASH. POST, May
15, 1997, at A25.
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ever, may generate a backlash among noncombatants, who, in many
cases, have borne the full brunt of the conflict. Experience suggests
that the UN alienates the populace at its peril. According to Heninger:
UNTAC's experience ... suggests that in the situations where consent
has been obtained, but where it may suspect for one or more parties,
the United Nations ought to take into consideration the views of the lo-
cal populace. The people's support for the UN mission may substitute,
in some instances, for the faltering commitment of a contending party's
leaders, thus helping to keep the mission going.214
However, the sheer intensity and depth of the desire on the part of
bystanders to see the strife end may decrease this possibility. Hen-
inger, for example, has underscored the Cambodian "people's over-
whelming desire for peace ... Similarly, Salvadoran and Mozambican
exhaustion with civil war lent support to UN peace-keeping." 215 Fur-
ther mitigating this risk of alienation is the fantastic success that the
UN has had in getting its message out via radio in various peace opera-
tions.216 This medium could be used to explain why rewards are being
targeted at a particular group.
L. Rewards and the Situation Prevailing within the Party to be
Influenced
1. Internal Dynamics
The political state of play within the party to be influenced may de-
214. HENINGER, supra note 135, at 131.
215. Id. At the same time, many have been guilty of overestimating the desire of com-
batants and their followers to make peace. As Lamb has noted:
Diplomats and UN officials tried to reassure themselves that the situation
was different. Mozambicans, they said, were tired of a war that left more
than half a million dead, displaced 4m people and created 1.5m refugees as
well as leaving the country devastated and littered with landmines. Renamo
was a spent force and Dhlakama had insisted he would not return to the
bush. Similar things were said in Angola in 1992 and in the suddenly empty
streets of Maputo, there was evidence here of a return to civil war.
Lamb, supra note 112, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, English Non-US File.
216. Heninger has mentioned:
UNTAC's information and education was a model for informing the popula-
tion about UN objectives and progress. It conducted a successful massive
civil education campaign in human rights awareness, mine precautions, and
electoral matters. Most important, it did a superb job of mass instruction in
some of the basic tenets of democracy.
HENINGER, supra note 135, at 121. Given this success, some have called upon the UN to
use radio and television to "head off or stop wars by mobilizing airwaves that are too often
used to set them off." Keith Spicer, Propaganda for Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1994, at
23.
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termine the success of UN rewards. Like states, political organizations
involved in strife are inevitably not unitary actors. Rather, they will be
comprised of factions vying with each other for control over charting the
course taken by the group.217 If militants are in ascendancy, induce-
ment efforts may prove ineffective.2 18 Lawson, for example, has pointed
to the domestic political equation in Iran as an explanation for the fail-
ure of an influence attempt using positive inducements.2 19 He has
speculated that the effectiveness of rewards will be determined by mul-
tiple domestic variables. These include the strength of interests favor-
ing a continuation of hostilities, whether the political costs of accepting
the positive sanctions outweigh continuing on with the conflict, and the
extent to which the rewards offered can be used by the target.220
Before the UN relies on rewards, it would do well to gather infor-
mation about the political dynamics inside the party to be influenced.
When it comes to disputants involved in conflicts considered marginal
to the security of the great powers, such data is likely to be difficult to
acquire. The sudden appearance of new parties in disputes only com-
plicates matters. 221 The absence of a functioning state apparatus in
many post-Cold War conflict areas would seem to make the task of
gathering reliable information even harder. Structures such as legisla-
tive bodies and regulatory agencies may be controlled, or lobbied by, dif-
ferent interest groups or factions under the umbrella of a given dispu-
tant. These activities have the potential of leading to a greater
awareness of what issues are important to, unite, and divide the differ-
ent factions in an organization and how deep these bonds and fissures
are.
217. See Issue of Multi-Party Politics in Sudan Causes Heated Debate, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Jan. 26, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2208488 ("Breakaway rebel factions
from the mainstream Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) have meanwhile rallied to
the junta.").
218. See, e.g., Bill Schiller, ANC-Pretoria Relations at Lowest Ebb, TORONTO STAR,
Apr. 10, 1991, at A19 (reporting that while negoations between the ANC and South Afri-
can government stalled, the ANC was "undergoing an internal struggle between doves
committed to negotiations, led by Mandela, and hawks who demand a more militant pos-
ture, lead by Chris Hani").
219. Lawson, supra note 48, at 321.
220. Id. at 321.
221. Late 1994, for example, saw the entrance of the Taliban into the conflict occurring
in Afghanistan. The Economist reported:
A new force is emerging in Afghanistan, the taliban. The word means "seek-
ers", and is generally applied to Islamic theology students. They have taken
control of Kandahar, a sizable town in the south, and are reported to be ad-
vancing on Ghazni, 140 kilometres (90 miles) from Kabul, the capital, and on
Sheikabad, which is even closer.
The taliban who have taken over Kandahar seem to have appeared out of
nowhere late last year and taken possession of the road between Pakistan
and Kandahar, before going on to capture the town itself.
With Gun and Koran: Afghanistan, ECONOMIST, Feb. 4, 1995, at 30.
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Where there is no state or in the case of actors, like rebel organiza-
tions, that are fighting for control, it can be argued that such patterns
of interaction and the attendant understanding that can be gleaned
from observing them disappear. Rather, internal decisionmaking proc-
esses may be ad-hoc or shrouded in secrecy. This posture allows the
group to present a united front to its adversaries and the rest of the
world. To realize this same imperative and to maximize scarce re-
sources, there may simply be no political debate within the organiza-
tion. After all, this activity consumes time and other scarce re-
sources. 222 Similarly, in entities led by charismatic leaders, discussion
may be a scarce commodity. In situations where the leader's word is ac-
cepted as law by an overwhelming portion of the organization's backers,
directing positive sanctions at this figure is not likely to change the
group's internal dynamics. At the same time, the absence of serious
contenders for leadership of the group might mean that it will be easier
for the person heading it to make a move in the direction of peace in re-
turn for a reward. If such figures are resistant to UN overtures, little is
likely to be accomplished.
The cohesiveness or political unity of disputants may influence UN
reward strategies. In many conflicts, especially those that have arisen
since the end of the Cold War, it is unclear how much authority those
who purport to command and control the party's rank-and-file actually
enjoy. 223 When a cease fire violation occurs, a breakaway group that no
longer recognizes the authority of the agent that has signed off on the
truce agreement may have committed it.224 Or, the violators, who are
only posing as rogue elements, may actually be acting pursuant to the
222. Georg Simmel, for example, has noted that groups tend to become more central-
ized when they are involved in conflicts. According to him:
The need for centralization, for the tight pulling together of all elements,
which alone guarantees their use, without loss of energy and time, for what-
ever the requirements of the moment may be, is obvious in the case of con-
flict. It is so obvious that there are innumerable historical examples where
such centralization supersedes even the most perfect peacetime democracy.
GEORG SIMMEL, CONFLICT 88 (Reinhard Bendix trans., 1955).
223. The history of the Euskadi Ta Euskadi (ETA) has been a succession of internal
conflicts. In 1966, the movement split into two groups, ETA-Zarra (Old ETA) and ETA-
Berri (Young ETA). The latter forsook violence and eventually became the Movimiento
Comunista de Espafia. In 1970, ETA-Zarra divided into ETA 5th Assembly and ETA 6th
Assembly. ETA 6th Assembly also gave up the armed struggle and re-named itself the
Liga Comunista Revolucionaria. Then in the mid-seventies there was yet another parting
of the ways when ETA 5th Assembly gave birth to ETA-Military and ETA-Politico.
military. Finally in 1981 ETA-Politiico-military was grievously weakened when it split
into ETA-pm (7th Assembly), whose members dissolved their organization the following
year, and ETA pm-(8th Assembly).
JOHN HOOPER, THE SPANIARDS: A PORTRAIT OF THE NEW SPAIN 223 (1986).
224. See, e.g., Nation-World Briefing, SALT LAKE TRIB. Jan. 9, 1996, at A2, ("NATO's
Warning: NATO officials, stung by a series of nasty cease-fire violations, told rogue ele-
ments from all Bosnian warring parties to stop shooting or face the consequences.").
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directives of the signatory. 25 These ambiguities may complicate the
conflict-resolution process.
Using rewards may prove particularly effective in efforts to gain
leverage over important subsets of a faction involved in a conflict. It
may, for example, be strategically helpful to deliver rewards to factions
that are only loosely aligned with the party's power structure. In re-
turn, they would withdraw from the conflict or activity support the
adoption of a settlement posture. 226 Such actions may hasten other de-
fections or cause the leadership to rethink its intransigence. Kriesberg
has highlighted the logic undergirding the selective application of nega-
tive incentives, concluding that "coercion may be applied divi-
sively .... [t]hus, it may be conducted selectively so that only a segment of
the adversary party experiences it. The segment of the conflict group
suffering a disproportionate burden of the fight may be especially likely
to become disenchanted with the struggle."227 This insight may pertain
to the discriminatory application of positive incentives as well. How-
ever, a faction would be singled out for a reward or promised one, not
punished or threatened with punishment.228
If attempts to bring about the defection of moderate elements fail,
the UN could target positive inducements at recalcitrant subsets of par-
ties. For example, the leadership of a group or those in control of its ca-
pacity to generate propaganda might be singled out for rewards in ex-
change for their agreement to make peace or simply bow out of the
strife.229 Of course, if these cohorts are not identifiable, the feasibility
225. Leonid L. Fituni has asserted:
UNITA's tactics at the negotiations were in many ways similar to that of the
parties in the Bosnian war: every time some kind of agreement had been
reached at the peace talks, UNITA tabled new demands, and cited disobedi-
ence of field commanders as the cause for the breakdown of ceasefires.
Fituni, supra note 166, at 154.
226. Referring to the reconstruction program that the international community is at-
tempting to put in place in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a senior European diplomat has said,
'[c]all it a bribe but economic reward is the best way of undermining the hardliners and
making peace stick. It is not happening and that is worrying.' See, e.g., Margaret de
Streel, Europe Eastern Update: A Roundup of East European Business and Political De-
velopments, Mar. 12, 1996, WALL ST. J. EUR. at 1. Similarly, "[w]hile working hard to es-
tablish good relations with major warlords like Aideed and Ali Mahidi, [Mohamed]
Sahnoun, [the Secretary-General's first special representative in Somalia], also bypassed
them by cultivating the support of clan elders, a traditional source of authority in Somali
society, for a sustained grassroots reconciliation effort along the lines initiated in north-
ern Somalia." Patman, supra note 29, at 90.
227. LOuis KRIESBERG, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS 169 (1973).
228. Kriesburg ignores the possibility that punishing a subset of a disputant will only
alienate it further. This possibility may function as another argument for rewarding it for
taking steps to remove itself from the conflict.
229. Keith Spicer, for example, has drawn attention to the fact that "[h]ate campaigns
on Serbian and Croatian television helped brew Bosnia's horrors." and has noted that
"[t]he Hutus' Radio Mille Collines ordered half a million murders and a death march of
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of this approach could be questioned.
An overly ambitious policy of encouraging defections may ulti-
mately generate anarchy. If the leadership of a disputant is induced to
go into exile, measures will have to be taken to accomodate the re-
maining fighters. These may be heavily-armed and subject to no
authoritative chain of command. Kriesberg has asserted:
Engaging in a common popular purpose submerges internal discord.
For example, there is some evidence that during civil rights campaigns
[during the 1960s in the American South], aggressive crimes by Ne-
groes decreased.... This can happen by absorbing energy and atten-
tion or by seeming to provide alternative ways of attaining sought-for
ends.230
The boundaries separating the military operations and criminal ac-
tivities of disputants in many conflicts may be decidedly hazy or even
nonexistent. Thus, it seems quite possible that former combatants
might resort to banditry. This scenario seems especially plausible if
they retain possession of the organization's destructive capacity and no
efforts are made to integrate them into civilian life. 231
2. Inducements as a Means to Alter the Internal Dynamics of a
Disputant
UN positive sanctions may change the distribution of power be-
tween different factions. Party cohesiveness could also be altered by
the use of rewards. Kriesberg, for example, has focused on the role that
President John F. Kennedy's offer of several inducements to the Soviet
Union played in Moscow's decision to sign on to the Partial Nuclear
Test Ban Agreement.23 2 In short, US gestures like the unilateral cessa-
tion of American atmospheric atomic tests were linked to the universal
observance of a similar moratorium. These concessions gave the Soviet
leader, Khrushchev, "something he could use to override his domestic
opponents to reach a weapons test ban."233 Similarly, strengthening
two million Rwandans." Spicer, supra note 216, at 23.
230. KRIESBERG, supra note 227, at 250-51.
231. As van Creveld has concluded:
[o]nce the legal monopoly of armed force, long claimed by the state, is
wrested out of its hands, existing distinctions between war and crime will
break down much as is already the case today in places such as Lebanon, Sri
Lanka, El Salvador, Peru, or Colombia. Often, crime will be disguised as
war, whereas in other cases war itself will be treated as if waging it were a
crime.
VAN CREVELD, supra note 201, at 294.
232. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S.
No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
233. Kriesberg, supra note 55. at 12.
1998
DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
RENAMO's leadership functioned as part of the logic pressed into ac-
tion by the UN to justify its establishment of a trust fund for this politi-
cal organization. 234
M Rewards and Perverse Incentives
Before the UN decides to rely on rewards, it should ensure that
these are not behavior-distorting in other contexts. This is a valid con-
cern. As Baldwin has noted, "[h]abitual use of positive sanctions is
more likely to encourage blackmail attempts than is habitual use of
negative sanctions."235 Until now, positive sanctions have played a pe-
ripheral role in international affairs. 236 Were their prominence to in-
crease, groups might attempt to extort rewards. Fortunately for the
UN, many of the disputants it is likely to interact with in the post-Cold
War era may lack an in-depth familiarity with UN activities in other
parts of the world. Ultimately, their awareness of previous UN reward
strategies may be determined partially by the amount of media atten-
tion such initiatives receive. 23 7 However, compared with military ef-
forts, which many media outlets scrutinize closely, the utilization of
positive inducements probably does not readily lend itself to intense
press coverage.
The UN can also minimize extortion efforts by establishing clear
linkages between its positive sanction and the action taken by the dis-
putant that is being rewarded. Thus, with regard to the RENAMO
trust fund, Boutros-Ghali made this connection. He noted that the
"monthly allowance [received by RENAMO] would be tied to scrupulous
implementation of the peace agreement according to the calendar ap-
proved by the parties concerned."238 Finally, disputants may be less
willing to argue that the UN's past use of rewards justifies their de-
mands for them if previous approaches utilized by this entity made use
of both positive and negative sanctions.
234. According to the Secretary-General, "[i]f the RENAMO leader is not enabled to
meet the expectations of his supporters, he will lose authority and prestige, and the entire
peace process will be destabilized." Letter Dated, supra note 80, at 216.
235. Baldwin, supra note 45, at 36.
236. See discussion supra part III.A.
237. As Edward C. Luck has noted, news of the failed raid against Aideed quickly
reached the "thugs who run Haiti [and they] dispatched a handful of their henchmen to
the docks in Port-au-Prince to chant that it would become another Mogadishu. This was
enough to turn US troop-carrying vessels around..." Luck, supra note 237, at 77. Of
course, in the case of positive sanctions, disputants in one conflict would not attempt to
capitalize on failures to use them in another dispute, which was what the Haitian junta
did, but on their successful utilization. Thus, even if the UN is shaken down, it still wins
if the use of a reward ultimately persuades the disputant to lay down its arms.
238. Letter Dated, supra note 80, at 216.
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N. Prior UN Involvement with the Parties to be Influenced
What rewards accomplish may be determined by the UN's previous
dealings with the party to be influenced. Based on his study of various
cases in which positive sanctions were employed, Lawson concluded
that "countries that do not already have relatively substantial commer-
cial or financial connections with one or both of warring parties prior to
an attempt to use positive sanctions cannot use offers of economic assis-
tance or greater investment to establish such relations de novo as an
inducement to end the conflict." 239 Thus, it may be very difficult for the
UN to rely on positive inducement strategies. As an organization de-
signed to enhance international security, the maintenance of commer-
cial or financial ties with different actors on the world stage does not
rank high on the UN's agenda. 240 Rather, most of its dealings take
place on the political level although it is true that states and NGOs do
receive development and humanitarian assistance from such parts of
the UN system as the United Nations Development Programme. The
UN might make use of these contacts to gain leverage over the parties
to an international dispute. However, these will be of little use in many
internal conflicts because it does not routinely interact with nongov-
ernmental political entities241 although there are some noteworthy ex-
ceptions to this rule.242
The UN's ability to employ positive sanctions may also depend on
its presence in the theater of the conflict. For example, UN decision-
makers may feel that rewards must be distributed rapidly to be effec-
tive. They could also feel that the measures to be taken should reach a
large number of actors. Thus, inducement strategies might have made
more of a difference in Cambodia than in Angola. After all, the UN had
developed, as a result of its Cambodian multidimensional operation, a
relatively elaborate infrastructure in that country. 243 Meanwhile, in
239. Lawson, supra note 168, at 651.
240. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1 1 (declaring that the core function of the United Na-
tions is "[t]o maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace.").
241. As Sydney D. Bailey has remarked:
A major problem for the United Nations has been that international peace
has often been endangered by the aspirations and actions of entities other
than states, and that the Organization is so constructed that its organs pre-
fer to deal with states rather than with dissident political organizations, in-
surgent groups, liberation movements, communal minorities, and the like.
SYDNEY D. BAILEY, How WARS END: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE TERMINATION OF
ARMED CONFLICT, AT 1946-1964 21 (1982).
242. For example, the UN certifyed SWAPO as the "sole and authentic representative
of the Namibian people." See G.A.Res. 31/152, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 39, at
136, U.N.Doc. A/31/39 (1977).
243. See Mats Berdal & Michael Leifer, Cambodia, in THE NEW INTERVENTIONISM
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Angola, during UNAVEM III, the few UN personnel there were engaged
primarily in electoral monitoring and demobilization. 244
IV. CONCLUSION
A. Findings of Part III
Since the end of the Cold War, foreign policy experts have at-
tempted to prescribe the optimal level of great power involvement in
conflict-prone areas around the world.245 Branding their opponents
"neo-isolationists," many of the participants in this discourse insist that
outside actors actively suppress overseas strife. William Pfaff, for ex-
ample, has asserted that "[m]uch of Africa needs, to put it plainly, what
one could call a disinterested neo-colonialism" by European countries. 246
A policy of "engagement wherever, whenever" may have been viable
to pursue during the Cold War. Today, it is less tenable due to a variety
of political and economic obstacles that the great powers confront at
home. Ironically, this disengagement may allow the UN to take advan-
tage of the full promise of reward-based strategies. Indeed, this Article
has attempted to show that as the number of outside actors involved in
a given conflict area shrinks, so does the number of potential agents
who are in a position to dole out favors. Thus, the UN is likely to be
able to gain more leverage over the disputants in a unipolar environ-
ment than in contexts where a variety of sources of support exist. Po-
litically, the UN may enjoy more flexibility in its interaction with dispu-
tants in situations where the great powers, particularly the US, are not
actively involved.
There are other reasons for keeping states out of the dispute-
resolution process. As conflicts ripen, states may be pushed by domestic
constituencies to reward their clients if these parties begin to appear to
be settling. Elites should not succumb to these demands. After all, the
conflict's resolution may be delayed if disputants do not experience the
pressure usually associated with the ripening of a conflict. If they do
not feel this, these parties may be less inclined to make peace.
Surfacing at a number of points in Part III is the proposition that
the UN should be able to employ negative and positive strategies simul-
1991-1994, at 25, 25 (James Mayall ed., 1996) ("At a cost of around US $1.7 billion, 22,000
military and civilian personnel were deployed [in Cambodia] .... ').
244. See STEPHEN M. HILL & SHAHIN P. MALIK, PEACEKEEPING AND THE UNITED
NATIONS 160 (1996) (noting that fewer than half of the expected 7,500 UNAVEM III
troops had arrived when their policing duties began).
245. See, e.g., Richard N. Haass, Paradigm Lost, FOREIGN AFF. Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 43
(evaluating multiple foreign policy postures for American decisionmakers).
246. William Pfaff, A New Colonialism? Europe Must Go Back into Africa, FOREIGN
AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 2.
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taneously to settle conflicts. Possession of this capacity would allow it
to pursue a generally more dynamic strategy when called upon to end
conflicts. Once subject to economic sanctions, a disputant would be de-
prived of its access to income and supplies, thus increasing the amount
of leverage the UN could achieve through a later use of positive sanc-
tions. The UN's decentralized structure, which features autonomous
agencies subject, more or less, to the gravitational pull of the Secretar-
iat, appears to lend itself to the utilization of a multipronged approach
to conflict-resolution. Thus, in some instances, the institutional bal-
kanization of the UN may actually endow it with the ability to pursue
relatively varied negotiating strategies.247 Decisionmakers can pursue
numerous goals and use diverse methods simultaneously. Over time, as
it becomes apparent which ones are being achieved, these can be accen-
tuated.
This Article has stressed the contribution that intelligence is likely
to make in UN efforts to end conflicts. Indeed, the form that rewards
take and when they are offered is likely to be shaped by the overall so-
cial, economic, and political context in which the conflict-resolution pro-
cess is unfolding. Intelligence, in turn, will be required to ascertain this
information. To generate reliable intelligence, the UN can pursue sev-
eral different approaches. For example, it may attempt to tap into con-
ventional, covert intelligence-gathering mechanisms like satellites,
drones, remote sensing devices, and human intelligence. 248 These efforts
raise a host of profound legal, political, and security questions.
249
UN rewards may encourage disputants to voluntarily open them-
selves up to outside scrutiny. This would facilitate UN intelligence-
gathering efforts and allow the UN to evade the problems that crop up
when clandestine attempts to accumulate intelligence are made. In con-
trast, punitive policies may make gaining intelligence about disputants
even more difficult. Conflict, after all, may spawn the formation of a
siege mentality within the disputant or cause it to go on a war footing,
cutting off some or all of its contacts with the outside world. 250
The UN should make it clear that it is using rewards to settle con-
flicts. If it does not, there may be confusion about what it is trying to
accomplish. The recipient of the positive sanction as well as individuals
observing the UN influence attempt may misconstrue the gesture,
247. See supra text accompanying notes 154-158.
248. See, e.g., Captain Gregory P. Harper, Creating A U.N. Peace Enforcement Force: A
Case for U.S. Leadership, 18 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 49 (1994) ("As for intelligence, the
United Nations clearly will need some type of permanent capability.").
249. See, e.g., Lt. Col. Geoffrey B. Demarest, Espionage in International Law, 24 DENY.
J. INT'L L. & POLY 321, 321 (1996) (asserting that "[tihe intelligence gathering activities
of international organizations, however, generate ethical and practical problems similar
to those caused by the efforts of nation states.").
250. Cf. sources cited supra note 23.
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thinking it is a gift and thus warranting no response. 251 There are
other reasons for establishing linkages between UN reward strategies
and the action being rewarded. If, for example, positive inducements
are granted when a conflict begins to ripen, it should be clear that they
are contingent on the parties finding common ground on questions that
continue to divide them. Also, by continually emphasizing that its re-
wards are tied to the party's unwavering commitment, the UN may be
less likely to be blackmailed in future situations. Finally, explicit con-
nections made between the positive inducement and the action being
rewarded may allow the UN to rebut charges that it is behaving in a
partial manner.
B. Consequences for International Law
If the UN placed more faith in reward-based strategies, clearer
rules and regulations governing their use will need to be developed.
UN decisionmakers will have to spearhead this process. NGOs are
likely to play a crucial supporting role. The decisions ultimately arrived
at will be subject to little judicial scrutiny.2 2 Thus, it is crucial that ef-
forts are made to ensure that the strategies used dovetail with the prin-
ciples undergirding the UN's work.
By articulating rules for its positive inducement efforts, the UN
would be confirming the importance of shifts taking place in the inter-
national law-making process. The post-Cold War era, after all, has seen
non-state actors, including the UN and NGOs, become an increasingly
important presence in the formation of international norms and legal
arrangements. 25 3 Thus, by articulating norms governing its use of posi-
tive sanctions, the UN would be part of the international community's
move away from a conception of international law formation that is ut-
terly dominated by the nation-state.
By formulating rules for its reward strategies, the UN would be
able to set a precedent for the use of positive inducemets by other im-
portant actors, including states. Usually, governments spearhead the
process of creating norms regulating the conduct of international af-
fairs. For example, states played a key role in the development of cus-
toms and legal instruments governing the conduct of armed hostilities,
which had come into force long before the UN came into being. 25 In
251. See discussion supra part III.B.
252. See discussion supra part IV.D.4.
253. See, e.g., Jost Delbruck, The Role of the United Nations in Dealing with Global
Problems, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 277, 292 (1997) (noting that "many other U.N.
organs, including the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the subsidiary organs
created under treaty law drawn up under the auspices of the U.N., allow NGO participa-
tion").
254. See, e.g., Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous
or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571,
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important respects, these rules privilege the interests of states. For ex-
ample, some of the legal protections available to participants involved
in an international conflict are not applicable to combatants waging an
internal war.255 Thus, governments enjoy relatively pronounced freedom
of action in how they prosecute a war against their own citizens. This
flexibility shrinks when they have been attacked by a hostile neighbor-
ing regime.
By taking the lead in generating customs, or even codifying norms,
to regulate how rewards are employed, the UN would be in a position to
ensure that it has more of a say in the substance of these rules. As an
institution that increasingly interacts with NGOs and other non-state
entities, the policies it adopts might be more sensitive to the needs and
aspirations of these important actors. In contrast, if states themselves
controlled the process by which rules regulating reward strategies were
articulated, the resulting regime might be very different.
If a UN-inspired body of rules regulating reward strategies devel-
oped, states electing to make use of positive inducments might feel
bound by it. The possibility of UN conflict-resolution strategies shaping
future state action underscores the importance of UN efforts remaining
consistent with the principles and values this entity is attempting to
inject into the conduct of foreign affairs around the world as a new cen-
tury dawns.
571-82, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, 65-74; Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277-2309; and the Convention with Respect to the Laws
and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803-26.
255. See, e.g., William J. Fenrick, Attacking the Enemy Civilian as a Punishable Of-
fense, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 539 (1997) (noting that "... nor do the grave breach
provisions of the Geneva Conventions apply to internal conflicts.").
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